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ESSAY 
The Primary Right 
CARTER DILLARD* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
“I wish to speak a word for Nature, for absolute freedom and 
wildness, as contrasted with a freedom and culture merely civil.”1 
  
This essay seeks to fill a gap in the law: the conspicuous 
absence among commonly accepted civil and political human 
rights2 theories of any particular right that tells us where the 
other rights ought to exist – not the jurisdictions in which they 
apply, but what the physical world those other rights occupy 
ought to look like.  In other words, what sort of environment do 
humans have a right to? 
This essay fills the gap by adding one right to the list of 
commonly accepted civil and political human rights, what can be 
 
  
*Visiting Scholar, Vulnerability and Human Condition Initiative, Emory 
University School of Law, Spring, 2012; Director of Litigation, Animal Legal 
Defense Fund.  This essay was originally presented at the United Nations World 
Civic Forum in 2009, and altered substantially based on excellent comments 
provided by the faculty in a workshop at Loyola University New Orleans, 
College of Law.  I owe special thanks to the participants of a workshop at the 
Just World Institute, University of Edinburgh, for comments on a related article 
that challenged me to develop the notion of bare autonomy, and to the many 
commentators who reviewed early drafts.  As always I owe my greatest thanks 
to Kate Fletcher, my research assistant, without whom this essay would not be 
possible.  This essay is dedicated to Christopher Johnson McCandless. 
 1. Henry David Thoreau, Walking, in THE PORTABLE THOREAU 592 (Carol 
Bode ed., 1964). 
 2. See generally PAUL SIEGHART, THE LAWFUL RIGHTS OF MANKIND: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL CODE OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1985). 
1
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called “the primary right.”  The primary right is a general human 
claim-right3 to completely exit all polities and enter states of non-
polity or wilderness (a specialized concept related to but not 
synonymous with legal wilderness, described in detail below), or 
places where there is an absence of human political association, 
and absence of others’ power, control, or influence. 
The right is derived from the premise that in order for 
individuals to be truly autonomous they must consent to being a 
part of a political system.  Further, unless there exists an 
alternative to participation in a political system – a right to walk 
away from all human polities – consent is meaningless if not 
impossible and individual autonomy  is thus undermined. How 
can you consent to something if you have no alternative?  In a 
world filled with political association, or others’ power and 
influence, non-consent to political association becomes impossible.  
Logically, if one values consensual political association, one must 
also value the alternatives to political association, i.e., places void 
of human influence, which would make choosing to associate 
possible.  The essential insight of this essay is thus that 
wilderness is inextricable from autonomy and must therefore be 
preserved, and perhaps restored, to allow persons to access it as 
an alternative to others’ power, control, and influence.  Properly 
understood, liberal political philosophy must value wilderness 
because only access to the wilderness can make possible truly 
consensual human political society. 
The primary right demands strong environmental 
protections, and responds to recent arguments that a religious or 
non-rational basis is needed to support environmental protection 
because those protections often only benefit the non-human 
world. Also, the primary right directly addresses three distinct 
but related problems facing environmental law theorists today: 
how to choose a baseline from which to develop environmental 
 
 3. A claim-right is a right to claim another person’s duty to do or not do 
something, as opposed to a liberty (or liberty-right) which is the absence of a 
duty to do or not do something.  See generally Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some 
Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 
16 (1913). 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol29/iss3/5
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regulation,4 how to articulate environmental rights, including a 
human right to a particular environment, and how to define what 
we mean by the term overpopulation.  While discussed in detail 
below, the primary right begins to address these problems by 
posing a simple question: do you, at this moment, as you read 
these lines, have reasonable access to the non-human world? 
While the right is based upon the objective value of autonomy 
through consent, recognizing and protecting the right would have 
desirable consequences as well: relevant to climate change, urban 
sprawl, the loss of species, the spread of toxins, etc., as well as 
social consequences, not the least of which would be how 
thoughtful persons, if truly respecting the primary right, would 
have to become about bringing other persons into the world.  As 
should become clear, had the human rights theorists that, 
decades ago, developed the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
been thinking along the lines of the primary right, we likely 
would not be faced with the mass environmental degradation and 
threat of climate change that exists today. 
The picture that will emerge then is not a state called 
Wilderness to which all of the non-human world has been 
relegated (an error I refer to below as the “territory trap” and 
which obviously would entail significant human influence), but 
polities in a sea of wilderness, islands of consensual human 
political association in a sea of non-polity.  Is this so fantastical?  
It describes our world today, the oceans being relatively 
autonomous zones between growing masses of human power and 
influence.5  But we ought not to be forced to sea6 in order to be 
free. 
This essay is, at base, a normative argument for a human 
right to wilderness, a right that effectively buttresses the 
presently rickety foundation of environmental lawmaking.  Its 
 
 4. See generally DOUGLAS A. KYSAR, REGULATING FROM NOWHERE: 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND THE SEARCH FOR OBJECTIVITY (2010). 
 5. I owe this point to Derek Fincham. 
 6. The Seasteading Institute’s mission is to further the establishment and 
growth of permanent, autonomous ocean communities, enabling innovation with 
new political and social systems.  See THE SEASTEADING INSTITUTE, http:// 
seasteading.org (last visited Apr. 30, 2012). 
3
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claims sit comfortably between political philosophy and 
normative environmental law theory, using truths from the 
former about consent and legitimacy to solve problems in the 
latter, a field struggling to justify the inherent value of the non-
human world against seemingly competing liberal values.  That 
said, the concept of the primary right will seem foreign to many 
liberals who conceive of autonomy as the absence of restraint, 
something subsumed by the more demanding notion of autonomy 
as the absence of others’ influence. 
Others will find such a highly theoretical discussion 
irrelevant to positive law and the practice of environmental 
regulation.  But lawyers and lawmakers should be able explain 
why we have environmental law at all, and why it is justified.  
The primary right does that by framing a totally novel answer 
with liberal political premises that many who oppose 
environmental regulation accept. Environmentalists have a 
human rights claim to make, and a powerful one.  The primary 
right justifies environmental protections which trump many other 
competing interests, so much so that weakening or repealing 
things like the Wilderness or Endangered Species Acts7 would not 
only be wrong, but constitute a grievous violation of human 
rights. 
Part II of this essay lays out the theoretical argument for a 
right to completely exit human society – the primary right – and 
will distinguish this right from traditional exit rights. Part III 
demonstrates that complete exit requires access to and protection 
of wilderness. Part IV then bridges exit rights theory and 
environmental law theory, demonstrating that the primary right 
solves, heretofore substantial, challenges to environmental law 
theory. Finally, Part V lays out and responds to likely 
counterarguments to the claims made herein.  Future work will 
show that the primary right can be supported by positive law, 
both domestic and international, and that protecting and 
furthering the primary right is politically, economically, and 
culturally feasible. 
 
 7. Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (1973) 
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531—44); Wilderness Act, Pub. L. No. 88-
577, 78 Stat. 890 (1964) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131—1136). 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol29/iss3/5
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II. CONCEIVING THE PRIMARY RIGHT 
What is the first or primary human right8 – that particular 
act or state of being which we first permit or refuse another 
person when we are working out how we will treat each other, 
and upon which the rights and duties we then hash out together 
may arguably rest?  Many have said, at least in passing, that 
particular rights are primary.  Thomas Paine said that the right 
to vote “is the primary right by which other rights are protected,” 
because without it we are subjected to the will of other persons.9  
Others have considered whether it is the right to speak freely 
that is the primary right,10 or the “inherent worth of each 
person,”11 while some have said that “the right to food is the 
primary human right.”12  Many, like Louis Henkin, have 
 
 8. See JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 181 (Oxford Univ. Press 
1986) [hereinafter RAZ, MORALITY] (“Assertions of rights are typically 
intermediate conclusions in arguments from ultimate values to duties.”).  See 
also id. at 166 ("‘X has a right’ if and only if X can have rights and, other things 
being equal, an aspect of X's well-being (his interest) is a sufficient reason for 
holding some other person(s) to be under a duty.”  Generally, human rights 
claims are based on those interests we believe we have, and which others ought 
to value and respect, simply because we are human.  Readers who know Raz’s 
work will be surprised to see him cited in a claim that will appear at first glance 
to support a choice-based, rather than an interest-based, right.  As will be made 
clear below, the primary right protects (as a negative right) and furthers (as a 
positive right) an interest in what will be called bare autonomy.  Bare autonomy 
is different and should be unbundled from the form of autonomy Raz critiques as 
the “simple principle,” but also from the form of autonomy, “valuable autonomy,” 
Raz defends.  Id. at 12-14, 381; JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASONS AND NORMS 11-
18 (1999) [hereinafter RAZ, PRACTICAL REASONS]; see also Donald H. Regan, 
Authority and Value: Reflections on Raz's Morality of Freedom, 62 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 995, 998 (1989). 
 9. Thomas Paine, Dissertation on First Principles of Government (1795), in 
THE THOMAS PAINE READER 452 (Michael Foot & Isaac Kramnick eds., 1987). 
 10. See Sydney Kentridge, Freedom of Speech: Is it the Primary Right?, 45 
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 253 (1996). 
 11. Helen Ginger Berrigan, "Speaking Out" About Hate Speech, 48 LOY. L. 
REV. 1, 2-3 (2002) (“[T]he Europeans and international human rights community 
promote as the primary human right the inherent worth of each person, 
including all the trait-based qualities that make up that person's identity.”). 
 12. Christoph Stueckelberger, Food Crisis: The Right to Food is the Primary 
Human Right, TAGES-ANZEIGER, Apr. 17, 2008, at 27 (“The right to freedom of 
expression or political participation is of no use at all to the person dying of 
hunger.”). 
5
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described the right to life as the primary human right.13  
However, Winston Churchill said that it is “the primary right of 
men to die and kill for the land they live in,”14 and U.S. 
constitutional scholars have argued that both Blackstone and the 
Framers saw self-defense as the primary human right.15 
I will argue that none of these can properly be deemed the 
primary right, at least in the sense of being the first act or state 
of being the permission or refusal of which is, as a descriptive 
matter, determined when working out how one person will treat 
another.  Instead, we must obviously determine whether we, or 
the other person in question, are to be part of the particular 
system of rights and duties at issue.  That is, whether we will 
treat each other at all.  The primary human behavior or state of 
being determined by any system of rights is of course whether I, 
the putative right-holder in question, am even part of it.  No right 
or duty in that system applies to me if I am not part of it; thus 
determining whether I am or not is primary.16 
Additionally, as a normative matter, asserting the primary 
right is to assert that one ought to be able to choose to consent or 
not consent to any and all political systems.  To the extent 
consent is necessary to justify political association17 (something 
 
 13. See Phillip A. Aka, Analyzing U.S. Commitment to Socioeconomic Human 
Rights, 39 AKRON L. REV. 417, 451 (2006) (quoting Louis Henkin, The Universal 
Declaration and the U.S. Constitution, 31 PS. POL. SCI. & POLITICS 512, 515 
(1998)) (“The primary human right that can be protected in all situations by the 
international community is the right to life. . . . [T]he most fundamental right is 
the right of existence.”). 
 14. WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING PEOPLES: 
THE BIRTH OF BRITAIN 27 (1956). 
 15. See Don B. Kates, A Modern Historiography of the Second Amendment, 56 
UCLA L. REV. 1211, 1221 (2009). 
 16. The claim made herein, that a particular form of exit right called the 
primary right ought to be recognized, should be distinguished from “primary 
rights” as that term is used in Allen Buchanan’s helpful typology dividing rights 
to secede into primary right and remedial right theories.  See Allen Buchanan, 
Theories of Secession, 26 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 31 (1997).  There is an obvious 
connection between that typology and how I use the term “primary,” but 
“primary” as used in the typology refers to non-remedial theories of secession by 
groups of people (that is, not derived from or seeking to remedy some injustice), 
rather than the primary human right I discuss herein. 
 17. Communitarians will deny this premise but this short essay will not 
defend the idea of consent-based political association, mostly because that 
defense already occupies whole shelves of libraries, and because this essay 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol29/iss3/5
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taken as a given by many liberals and referred to as the 
Fundamental Liberal Principle),18 consent is necessary to justify 
any amount of political association.  Conceptually, once one 
withdraws consent, what legitimacy does the State (or any other 
person) have to any amount of your continued association?  Also, 
if you believe that you have to give your consent to be subject to 
another’s will, what legitimates others changing the world in 
which you live – at all – without your consent?  Second, to the 
extent one has the general right to withdraw consent and exit a 
polity, she or he has the right to exit all polities.  Otherwise, one 
would simply be compelled to associate with the least 
objectionable polity.  Third, the right to exit all polities 
completely requires access to, and therefore the continued 
existence of, non-polity or wilderness.  Without it there is no 
possibility of not consenting.  Therefore, to the extent consent is 
necessary to justify political association, wilderness must 
continue to exist and persons must have access to it. 
The primary right is oriented around a theoretical ideal or 
value we call wilderness, the way other rights are oriented 
around other theoretical ideals or values like free speech, privacy, 
and due process.  Though we never totally achieve those values or 
ideals, mostly because we have to balance them against 
competing ideals and values like national security, they very 
much exist and we know this because we use them to guide our 
behavior, much the way our ideal of the perfect home guides our 
behavior though we may never quite achieve it.  The ideal at the 
core of the primary right, wilderness, non-polity, or the absence of 
political association is used as a baseline to counterbalance 
conflicting values; the argument that what the right calls for can 
never be completely achieved misses the mark.  The idea will be 
to strive towards the ideal as a matter of degree as one 
accommodates conflicting interests, the way we still strive 
towards free speech, privacy, and due process in the face of the 
 
specifically targets liberals who overlook the limits liberalism logically places on 
how we treat the nonhuman world. 
 18. See infra note 31 and accompanying text.  A corollary to the right to leave 
a polity by withdrawing one’s consent to political association is the authority one 
has to consent (or not) to the admission of new members into one’s existing 
polity.  See Carter Dillard, Antecedent Law: The Law of People-Making, 79 MISS. 
L.J. 873, 895-99 (2010). 
7
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conflicting value of perfect national security without ever 
perfectly satisfying any of those values. 
The right is based upon the objective values of the things the 
right protects: consent, autonomy, and wilderness, the last being 
something humans have throughout the history of our species 
had easy access to but which in the flash of two centuries has 
been almost eradicated.  That the right is based on objective 
values is important.  That means it is to be protected, irrespective 
of subjective preference, market outcomes, and the democratic 
process.  Just as the right to vote is not contingent on what the 
majority thinks or the people actually voting, the primary right is 
not defeated by counterarguments about mass personal 
preference.  As will be discussed below, wilderness is also 
objective in another sense: it is an object with the potential to be 
converted to any number of subjective uses, each valuable to 
different groups of humans users, but which remain in its 
unconverted, or objective, state. 
Before proceeding to justify and develop the contours of this 
right, it is worth pinning down certain key conceptions. 
A. Foundational Conceptions 
To begin with, to speak of individual rights is to speak of 
autonomy.  All individual rights assume that there exists a range 
of individual behavior, or conduct, which is worth protecting from 
others.19 
The concept of “autonomy” can be unbundled into various 
conceptions.20  Two such conceptions are what Joseph Raz calls 
the “the simple principle” and “valuable autonomy.”21  The former 
(which I will refer to as the failed form of autonomy) is the 
 
 19. RAZ, MORALITY, supra note 8. 
 20. Privacy and autonomy are closely related concepts but I focus on the 
latter because privacy seems to commonly involve questions about personal 
information, which is not particularly relevant to the primary right.  That said, 
Ruth Gavison’s conception of privacy as being completely inaccessible to others 
is similar to what I call “bare autonomy” herein.  See Ruth Gavison, Privacy and 
the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 428 (1980); but cf., Note, Legal Analysis and 
Population Control: The Problem of Coercion, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1856, 1910 nn. 
231-32 (1971). 
 21. RAZ, MORALITY, supra note 8. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol29/iss3/5
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presumption in favor of protecting, under the guise of 
intrinsically valuable freedom, all conduct as equally valuable 
without regard to the specific value or disvalue we may find in 
the particular conduct at issue.22  . This is simply the view that 
autonomy involves choosing to do, and doing, whatever one 
wishes.  In my view it is a form of intellectual laziness, the broad 
claim that one ought to be able to do anything, everything, and 
nothing at once, which masks him or her avoiding the trouble of 
thinking it all through and delineating the oughts from the 
noughts.  Raz critiques this form of autonomy in favor of what he 
calls valuable autonomy.23 
For Raz, “[a]utonomy is valuable only if exercised in pursuit 
of the good,” and valuable autonomy is the presence and active 
pursuit of morally valuable options in life (i.e., the option to 
become a doctor, but not a mass murderer; to save a person, but 
not torture them; to be literate, but not illiterate; to care for 
animals, but not abuse them).24  Raz rejects the moral relativism 
and subjectivism that underlie claims to a general right to be 
free, finding that we value freedom only once we have certain 
capacities, and then only because it lets us do things that are 
good, things we objectively value.25 
A third form of autonomy, which I will call “bare autonomy,” 
is the state of being physically individuated from other persons 
and their influence, or becoming literally independent from 
others and therefore self-determining.  The term bare autonomy 
is novel but the conception can easily be derived from the common 
conception of individual autonomy.26  It is this form of autonomy 
 
 22. See RAZ, PRACTICAL REASONS, supra note 8, at 11-18; see generally Regan, 
supra note 8. 
 23. RAZ, MORALITY, supra note 8, at 381. 
 24. RAZ, MORALITY, supra note 8, at 381. See also Leslie Green, Un-American 
Liberalism: Raz's ‘Morality of Freedom’, 38 TORONTO L.J. 317, 324-25 (1988). 
 25. RAZ, MORALITY, supra note 8, at 381. 
 26. According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: 
Individual autonomy is an idea that is generally understood to refer 
to the capacity to be one's own person, to live one's life according to 
reasons and motives that are taken as one's own and not the product 
of manipulative or distorting external forces. . . . 
. . . Put most simply, to be autonomous is to be one's own person, to 
be directed by considerations, desires, conditions, and characteristics 
9
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that the primary right is meant to protect, being “free” as in when 
one says “she broke free,” or “she was finally free of him.” 
Bare autonomy is the conceptual inverse of being subjected to 
the influence, control and power of other humans.27  It borrows 
from Isaiah Berlin’s concept of negative liberty, which at its core 
refers to the absence of constraint by others.28  Bare autonomy 
goes one step further, and recognizes that to the extent other 
persons have changed the non-human environment they have 
exercised power over others.  They have interfered with me and 
others being free of their influence, being free of what Locke 
called the “Will of any other Man,”29 and thus free of the 
subjective changes they make and will upon the world.  They 
have interfered with my relationship to the objective world 
making me subject to their influence, their changes, and thus 
their will.  They and their will have gotten in the way, standing 
between me and a world without their will, or what we call 
wilderness, or non-polity, or the absence of others’ influence or 
will, a conception which I deal with more below. 
As will be discussed, one can see that the purest form of bare 
autonomy would be obtained by living in wilderness, free of all 
human influence.  This is a state of affairs comparable to Ruth 
Gavison’s perfect privacy: being completely inaccessible to 
others.30  Or, borrowing the words of Justice Brandeis when he 
referred to the right to privacy, it is “the right to be [literally] let 
 
that are not simply imposed externally upon one, but are part of 
what can somehow be considered one's authentic self. 
John Christman, Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy, in STANFORD 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY § 1 (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2009).  Though 
Christman does not discuss bare autonomy as a form of autonomy, he uses the 
word “one” six times in describing the basic conception of individual autonomy, 
creating an overwhelming sense of individuation, of the act of one individuating 
oneself from others. 
 27. The focus is on humans, as opposed to other species, because humans as a 
species seem to have a special capacity to influence the world and are the agents 
we exclusively award personhood to in the model of the social contract. 
 28. See ISAIAH BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 122 (1969). 
 29. See infra note 35 and accompanying text. 
 30. See Gavison, supra note 20. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol29/iss3/5
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alone – the most comprehensive of rights and the right most 
valued by civilized men.31 
 
 31. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 494 (1965) (quoting Olmstead v. 
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). 
  As an aside, United States constitutional jurisprudence can be 
reinterpreted to create a helpful analogy for understanding all of these 
conceptions, between what we are calling the primary right and privacy in 
modern substantive due process. Of course there is no express right to exit in 
the constitution.  Yet substantive due process, and specifically the right to 
privacy it recognizes, are comparable.  How can we justify the fundamental right 
of privacy (or for some who see a change in the jurisprudence after Lawrence v. 
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), liberty) as it appears in modern substantive due 
process?  Readers may have guessed how the primary right relates to this 
problem already.  It is well known that in the Court’s modern substantive 
jurisprudence it recognizes a continuum (or spectrum) of liberty.  See Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 169 (1973).  Could the vague fundamental right to privacy 
or liberty the Court invokes on occasion as a right protecting interests inside the 
polity, be tacitly speaking to (and bundled together with) the value of bare 
autonomy outside of the polity? 
  How are we to make sense of Justice Kennedy’s use, in Lawrence v. 
Texas, of the oft-critiqued statement from Planned Parenthood v. Casey which 
described the heart of U.S. constitutional liberty as “the right to define one's 
own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of 
human life,” and asserted that “[b]eliefs about these matters could not define 
the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State”? 
539 U.S. at 574.  Are these claims meaningless as some have said? See, e.g., 
Nelson Lund & John O. McGinnis, Lawrence v. Texas and Judicial Hubris, 102 
MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1577 (2004). 
  Consider that the Court’s description of liberty in Lawrence ties back to 
Griswold v. Connecticut and Olmstead v. United States before it.  Simplified, the 
Casey quote describes what the Court in Griswold, and Justice Brandeis in his 
dissent in Olmstead, described as “the right to be let alone – the most 
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.” Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 494 (1965) (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 
U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).  One cannot seriously argue that 
this is a meaningless statement, any more than one can argue that the 
statement “leave me alone” is meaningless.  Defining one’s self and one’s 
concepts, or being autonomous and self-determining, is like defining anything 
else; it is the act of setting the thing apart from its surroundings to permit an 
identity. 
  That said, there are degrees of being left alone.  A woman permitted by 
the state to terminate her pregnancy without interference from that state and 
others is left alone more than if she were not permitted to do it.  But she is not 
literally alone.  She is still part of the system of rights and duties, and is not 
alone in that sense.  The state and others are ready to swoop down upon her if 
she acts in certain other ways.  Being literally let alone, or autonomous and self-
determining, would only be possible outside of the system of rights and duties, 
and indeed, beyond the control and influence of others.  I am hardly “let alone” 
in my fenced backyard, relative to how I would be “let alone” to explore a 
11
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The concept of bare autonomy will not be acceptable to many 
who view humans as inextricably connected,32 though their 
critique may prove more descriptive than normative.  Again, the 
concept may also seem foreign to some liberals who view 
autonomy more as the absence of restraint, than the more 
comprehensive and demanding notion of autonomy as the absence 
of others’ influence.  However, it is not clear how one can value 
individual autonomy without also valuing bare autonomy, unless 
one abandons individuation, which is at the core of the former. 
The obvious challenge to the conception of bare autonomy is 
that even if one could leave all polities, one simply cannot walk 
away from morality and its system of rights and duties.  
However, this challenge can actually help us understand the 
conception of bare autonomy.  If we define morality as Dworkin 
does – as how we treat others – then we will understand that 
walking away from morality is exactly what is meant by the 
primary right: the right not to be treated by others paired with 
the dual correlative duties not to treat them.33  Humans in 
wilderness are obligated to practice relative noninterference.  
This is not as abstract as it may sound, but is consistent with a 
 
wilderness free of human influence.  If we consider the Casey and Olmstead 
quotes as referring to a continuum of being “let alone,” then the far end of the 
continuum, or bare autonomy, is only the complete and meaningful exit from all 
polities. 
  Of course the Supreme Court was never referring to bare autonomy per 
se; the cases in question had nothing to do with the far end of the continuum 
and were very much about living within a system of rights and duties. That is 
not the point of showing that the Court’s statement refers to a continuum that 
logically includes bare autonomy (though, assuming one values consent, there is 
arguably a strong basis for developing the primary right via the "implicit in the 
concept of ordered liberty" test).  Rather, the point here is that to the extent the 
Court relies on that continuum as something valuable on which to base a claim 
of right, it might have been implicitly recognizing the value of an outside form of 
autonomy, bare autonomy, as well as an inside form.  More importantly, as is 
discussed below, that recognition ties back to like statements in the Framers’ 
account of the rights of man, and in Locke’s work before that. 
  At the very least, it is possible the Court has inadvertently bundled 
together various forms of autonomy, simultaneously relying on all of the distinct 
interests the rights protect to amass support in those reading the Court’s 
opinions. 
 32. See Christman, supra note 26, § 3.2. 
 33. This is what makes collective exercise of the primary right complex, if not 
impossible, and why I refer to exit rather than secession. 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol29/iss3/5
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commonplace, everyday notion familiar to backcountry hikers 
known as the wilderness ethic.  If morality is how we treat others, 
wilderness is that we do not. 
Identifying a right as “the primary right” connotes more than 
the logical ordering of rights in a system of rights, or the 
assertion that the right is foundational or an ultimate trump 
card.  In this case, “primary” carries teleological implications: 
“the primary right” is the right that existed before systems of 
rights.  It exists in a literal state of wilderness, outside of and 
prior to human society and civilization. 
Finally, “polity” and “power” must be understood in terms of 
a continuum, or degrees, of control and influence that others 
exert upon the individual.  At one extreme lies absolute control by 
humans over another human, forced labor in a prison camp, for 
example.  At the other extreme lies the absolute of bare 
autonomy, self-determination, and lack of human otherness 
experienced by the individual alone in the wilderness.  The 
absolute power, control, or influence of one human over another is 
thus the conceptual inverse of bare autonomy. 
Traditional exit right and secession theories address the 
space between these poles, where we find varied systems of legal 
rights and duties usually enforced by the threat of force and 
groups entering and exiting those systems of power (polities) for 
any number of reasons.  In contrast, the primary right addresses 
a move towards the far end of the continuum, towards bare 
autonomy. 
 One can think of this in terms of the concepts of power and 
political obligation.34  The latter is the duty I have to obey the 
laws of any given polity.  The former refers to my being subject to 
another’s will or influence.  If everyone but me disappeared from 
the United States today, I would presumably be under no political 
obligation to others, not subject to any particular rights or duties 
that come with the legal system, because there would be no one to 
owe the duties to or demand the rights from.  However, I would 
still be largely subject to others’ will and influence – as well as 
the system of rights and duties that permitted that will and 
influence – because those persons cut down the trees, paved the 
 
 34. I owe this point to Dov Fox. 
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land, polluted the rivers, and exterminated the animals.  I would 
be living in a world of others’ making and be made subject to it.  
Whether I would be better off there – in the remnants of society – 
than I would be in the same space ten thousand years ago is 
irrelevant.  That is a matter of welfare.  The point is that though 
I am not under political obligation, I am subject to others’ power.  
But the concept of autonomy can be broadened enough to give an 
alternative to both political obligation and power.  Whatever 
autonomy means inside a polity, humans cannot be free in a very 
tangible sense if they are bounded in by one another, if others 
stand between them and the non-human world.  The primary 
right seeks to prevent that. 
B. The Primary Right Is an Exit Right, a Right to Not 
Consent to Others’ Power, Control, and Influence 
Bearing these analogies and conceptions in mind and 
assuming one justifies polities by whether they are consented to 
and those within them can exit or leave, we can begin to define 
the primary right.  Significantly, the very idea of a human right 
only matters in the context of inter-human conduct, that is, how 
we treat each other.  Thus, the most fundamental question in 
dealing with claims of human rights is first whether we will treat 
each other at all. 
We see this in traditional liberal political theory, and its 
reliance on a state of nature as a default backdrop to political 
relations.  For Locke, “[m]en being . . . by nature all free, equal, 
and independent, no one can be put out of this estate [natural 
liberty] and subjected to the political power of another without 
his own consent.”35  Indeed, as a normative matter, it is perhaps 
liberalism’s core principle (or at least one that we can here derive 
from the principle of consensual government)36 that persons 
ought to be able to walk away from one another, refusing to 
 
 35. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT ¶ 95 (1690), 
reprinted in THE TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge 
Univ. Press 1960) [hereinafter, LOCKE]; see also JEREMY WALDRON, GOD, LOCKE, 
AND EQUALITY: CHRISTIAN FOUNDATIONS IN LOCKE'S POLITICAL THOUGHT 213 
(2002); JEREMY WALDRON, THE DIGNITY OF LEGISLATION 137 (1999). 
 36. See Gerald Gaus & Shane Courtland, Liberalism, in STANFORD 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY § 1.1 (2010) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol29/iss3/5
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consent to the power, control, and influence of others when they 
wish in order to be let alone. 
In two different ways, liberals accord liberty primacy as a 
political value. (i) Liberals have typically maintained that 
humans are naturally in “a State of perfect Freedom to order their 
Actions . . . as they think fit . . . without asking leave, or 
depending on the Will of any other Man.” Mill too argued that 
“the burden of proof is supposed to be with those who are against 
liberty; who contend for any restriction or prohibition. . . . The a 
priori assumption is in favour of freedom . . .” . . . This might be 
called the Fundamental Liberal Principle: freedom is normatively 
basic, and so the onus of justification is on those who would limit 
freedom, especially through coercive means. It follows from this 
that political authority and law must be justified, as they limit 
the liberty of citizens. Consequently, a central question of liberal 
political theory is whether political authority can be justified, and 
if so, how. It is for this reason that social contract theory . . . 
developed . . . Insofar as they take as their starting point a state 
of nature in which humans are free and equal, and so argue that 
any limitation of this freedom and equality stands in need of 
justification (i.e., by the social contract), the contractual tradition 
expresses the Fundamental Liberal Principle.37 
Rousseau said: 
I am presupposing here what I believe I have demonstrated, 
namely that in the state there is no fundamental law that cannot 
be revoked, not even the social compact. . . . Grotius even thinks 
that each person can renounce the state of which he is a member 
and recover his natural liberty and his goods by leaving the 
country.38 
For Rousseau, and many others whose thinking frames our 
own thinking and basic assumptions about government today, the 
social compact was the “one law that by its nature requires 
unanimous consent,” because “civil association is the most 
voluntary act in the world,” and “no one can, under pretext 
 
 37. Id. 
 38. JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 79 (Donald A. Cress 
trans. & ed., Hackett Pub. Co. 1987). 
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whatever, place another under subjection without his consent.”39  
He called that consent, one’s voluntary association, the “primitive 
contract.”40 
1. The primary right requires complete exit 
The primitive contract, a core principle in liberal political 
theory, is thus that persons should be free to not consent to 
others’ power, control, and influence.  Should we then have the 
choice to be free from sovereigns, other persons, their “will” in the 
form of the changes they make, and influences they have on the 
world altogether?  Is the state of nature to which we would then 
return synonymous with wilderness or parts of the world – non-
polities – where human influence is minimized or eliminated?  
Rousseau’s and Locke’s words could be read to say we should and 
that it is synonymous.  Taking exit right theory to its logical 
conclusion does the same. 
A right to exit is a right to walk away from any particular 
system of rights and duties.  It protects what Richard Epstein 
calls that act of “picking up stock and going elsewhere.”41  The 
right is not only a bedrock of, and “crucial” to, liberal theory,42 
but it is required by Rawls’ principles of justice.43  It is also a key 
to Nozick’s utopia, where it is the only right (tied to a concomitant 
but conditional right to enter) people have.44  Intuitively we value 
it highly – imagine not being permitted to move, to leave the bad 
and declining neighborhood in which you live. 
However, the received wisdom of exit rights theory appears 
to be that we can only opt out of subjugation to one sovereign for 
another.  Ronald Dworkin makes this point in Law’s Empire, 
 
 39. Id. at 8. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Richard A. Epstein, Exit Rights Under Federalism, 55 L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 147, 149 (1992). 
 42. Hanoch Dagan & Michael A. Heller, The Liberal Commons, 110 YALE L.J. 
549, 566 (2001) (“If commons property can succeed only by giving up the right to 
exit, a liberal commons is indeed an oxymoron.”); see also Angela R. Riley, Good 
(Native) Governance, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1049, 1066 (2007). 
 43. See Mark D. Rosen, Establishment, Expressivism, and Federalism, 
Symposium: Law and Cultural Conflict, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 669, 704 (2003). 
 44. See Richard Thompson Ford, Geography and Sovereignty: Jurisdictional 
Formation and Racial Segregation, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1365, 1423 n. 215 (1997). 
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol29/iss3/5
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where he critiques tacit consent as a basis for the legitimacy of 
modern democracies.  He argues that the decision not to emigrate 
is insufficient to constitute consent to be governed for reasons 
that are very relevant to thinking about a primary right: 
Consent cannot be binding on people, in the way this argument 
requires, unless it is given more freely, and with more genuine 
alternative choice, than just be declining to build a life from 
nothing under a foreign flag. And even if the consent were 
genuine, the argument would fail as an argument for legitimacy, 
because a person leaves one sovereign only to join another; he 
has no choice to be free from sovereigns altogether.45 
Others have argued that “a state of unencumbered 
individuality . . . can just as easily be exercised by a desire to 
enter into another culture,”46 or even that “an individual’s 
secession claim is ridiculous; a town’s only slightly less so; a 
county’s somewhat more plausible; and a state or federal region’s 
paradigmatic.”47  Rawls almost suggests the same when, in his 
discussion of what “space” is necessary in a just society to allow 
the full range of conflicting values, he makes clear that “the idea 
of sufficient space is metaphorical.”48  The Supreme Court did 
much the same in Wisconsin v. Yoder when it explicitly labeled 
Thoreau’s freedom as merely a “philosophical and personal” 
choice and contrasted that with the Amish’s legitimate religious 
withdrawal from society, thereby denigrating and using 
Thoreau’s freedom as a foil to defend what the Court saw as the 
Amish’s valid religious claims.49 
 
 45. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 193 (1986). 
 46. Darren C. Zook, Decolonizing Law: Identity Politics, Human Rights, and 
the United Nations, 19 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 95, 116 (2006); see also Leighton 
McDonald, Can Collective and Individual Rights Coexist?, 22 MELBOURNE U. L. 
REV. 310, 331 (1998) (“[W]hether or not an individual is entitled to leave their 
cultural group in such circumstances is inevitably a question to be faced by the 
group to which emigration is sought.”). 
 47. Lee Seshagiri, Democratic Disobedience: Reconceiving Self-Determination 
and Secession at International Law, 51 HARV. INT'L L.J. 553, 583 (2010). 
 48. See JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 154-55 nn. 29-30 
(2001). 
 49. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1972). 
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Contrary to all of these claims, to the extent one accepts a 
right to exit one must also accept the right to exit completely.  
Exit is the right “to withdraw or refuse to engage . . .  to 
dissociate, to cut oneself out of a relationship with other 
persons.”50  In terms of positive law, according to Hanoch Dagan 
and Michael Heller, “certain rights of exit – such as the right to 
emigrate from one’s homeland – are now considered basic human 
rights, which are, as such, inalienable and nonwaiveable.”51  In 
addition to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which 
Dagan and Heller cite, Article 12(2) of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights grants every person a right to leave 
any country, including his or her own.52 
And to the extent one accepts the right to exit, one must 
accept the right to exit completely. What does the right otherwise 
refer to?  The international right to emigrate from one’s homeland 
discussed above does not permit the state to impose a duty on 
those emigrating to keep one foot in the country or periodically 
return.  Similarly, while Dagan and Heller find that some 
disincentives can be imposed prior to exit, their discussion of the 
value of exit as a precept of liberalism never suggests those 
exiting could be required to associate post-exit.53  Such a 
requirement would frustrate the purpose of the right because one 
would never be free to truly walk away.  Moreover, a right to 
leave any country, like that recognized above, implies a right to 
leave all countries. 
 Also, what are the consequences of Dworkin’s assumption, 
above, holding true?  One of the more powerful consequentialist 
arguments in favor of complete exit rights is that they incentivize 
organizations, in this case states, to compete for members.  If 
members cannot completely leave the least objectionable state, 
perhaps to form a state of their own, the baseline for competition 
and innovation is skewed and states are not really competing.  
We can never do better than the least objectionable state. 
 
 50. Dagan & Heller, supra note 42, at 568. 
 51. Id. at 569 n.79 (citing Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 13, 
G.A. Res. 217(III)(A), U.N. GAOR 3d Sess., pt. 1 at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948)). 
 52. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 12(2), opened 
for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976). 
 53. See generally Dagan & Heller, supra note 42. 
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Moreover, there would seem to be a direct relationship between 
the reasonableness of exit and the degree to which one is 
committed to the polity in question.  How committed can you 
really be if exit were virtually impossible? 
But the claim that a right to exit includes a right to 
completely exit need not rely on positive law or consequentialist 
arguments.  Conceptually, if consent is to contribute in any way 
to legitimizing the use of power, one must have the option not to 
consent.  Further, if we believe that the use of power must be 
justified – that is, that we can differentiate between legitimate 
and illegitimate power – then we must justify any and all power, 
control or influence, exerted by one person upon another.  Again, 
conceptually, once one withdraws consent, what legitimacy does 
the state (or any other person) have to any amount of your 
continued association?  To the extent consent is necessary to 
justify the power, control, and influence of others, it is necessary 
to justify any power, control and influence. 
The primary right must, therefore, include the right to an 
alternative to being a part of any polity at all.  Forcing one to 
submit against his or her will to some sovereign, albeit the one 
found least objectionable, or even to some small amount of that 
sovereign’s influence, vitiates consent-based justification for the 
authority of the state, in violation of what Rousseau called the 
“primitive contract.”54 
 
2. The primary right imposes duties not to interfere 
 
Once one has walked away from a particular system of rights 
and duties, how is one entitled to any duty of continuing 
noninterference held against that system and its members to 
keep them at bay? 
The right to exit is “antecedent to government”55 and “a 
prerequisite for liberty.”56  It is neither created, nor extinguished, 
 
 54. ROUSSEAU, supra note 38, at 106. 
 55. Steven G. Calabresi, “A Government of Limited and Enumerated  
Powers”: In Defense of United States v. Lopez, Symposium: Reflections on United 
States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 752, 776 (1995). 
 56. Dagan & Heller, supra note 42, at 570. 
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by the polity one wishes to leave.  That is, after all, why the exit 
right is unique and primary, and also valuable, preventing the 
polity a person leaves from simply recapturing him or her as an 
outsider now incapable of asserting duties.  The right to exit also 
exists conceptually before legal regimes because, as Pufendorf 
and the many other theorists cited herein like Rousseau, Grotius, 
and Locke have argued, the very legitimacy of the civil law 
system is itself based on consent.57 
The duty of continuing noninterference called for by the 
primary right must therefore be based on a different order of 
rights and duties that exists independent of the civil law system.  
Just as fundamental human rights constitute a meta-system of 
positive law and moral rules that exists a level above domestic 
legal systems (codified in treaty through state consent), the right 
of exit is an imperative that exists above or outside any consent-
based system of social order.  Thus, even though one has walked 
away from a particular system of rights and duties he or she is 
entitled to a duty of continuing noninterference held against that 
system and its members. 
This does not mean that all fundamental human rights apply 
in wilderness.  The primary right is again unique in that it is 
“antecedent to government,” indeed to social interaction of any 
kind, and therefore it arguably exists one level above the system 
of fundamental human rights, as a fundamental meta-human 
right.  As described in more detail below, “wilderness,” in its ideal 
form, is the place where a person can experience the ideal of 
absolute individual autonomy.  Because the primary right right-
holder would be outside of all human interaction, there is no 
reason to conceive of, let alone assert, any other human rights.  
He or she is alone, outside of morality, bound only by the 
exclusive correlative duties imposed by the primary right not to 
influence others – duties that would logically encompass many of 
the fundamental human rights, like respecting others’ right to 
life.  This is why the ideal nonpolity is not just a physical 
wilderness but outside of any jurisdiction; if the duty not to 
 
 57. See SAMUEL PUFENDORF, ELEMENTORUM JURISPRUDENTIAE UNIVERSALIS 
LIBRI DUO 160-61 (James Brown Scott ed., William Abbot Oldfather trans., 
Clarendon Press 1931) (1672). 
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influence others is taken seriously, it is not clear what role any 
law would play. 
To the extent that the right-holder interacts with other 
persons, he or she moves along the polity continuum of human 
influence, away from absolute autonomy towards traditional 
systems of rights and duties.  From this logic, it is now clear why 
the primary right is a right of exit rather than secession: while 
groups of persons can secede together to take advantage of in 
vacuis locis and establish a community, that new community is 
itself a polity with attendant traditional rights and duties.  While 
respecting the primary right will require the creation of non-
polity spaces, and doing so would make it easier for groups of 
people to secede by giving them the space they need, this would 
merely be a knock-on benefit flowing from the primary right.  The 
primary right protects the right of individuals to leave even those 
new polities and is therefore distinct from the right to secede. 
Note that the primary right also places a correlative duty on 
the right-holder, in a state of non-polity, not to influence others. 
In other words, the right goes both ways.  This means that the 
right would require persons capable of practicing relative 
noninterference. 
C. Differentiating the Primary Right from Traditional 
Exit Rights 
The primary right differs from traditional conceptions of exit 
rights in at least five ways.  First, as discussed, the literature on 
exit rights has focused on the act of choosing among polities, 
rather than the choice of no polity at all.  Second, proponents of 
exit rights tend to base the right almost exclusively on what I 
have called above the failed form of autonomy, subjective 
preference, which is antithetical to the form of autonomy, bare 
autonomy, which is protected by the primary right.58  Third, exit 
rights tend also to be seen as held by individuals against the 
state, whereas it is other persons generally that threaten the 
 
 58. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker, Should Liberals Fear Federalism?, 70 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 433, 444-45 (2002) (“[T]his personal right of exit is a negative freedom in 
the sense that the right itself is indifferent in principle to the uses to which it is 
put.”). 
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conditions that the primary right protects.  Fourth, exit rights are 
usually argued from highly abstract political, economic, and/or 
cultural perspectives, rather than in terms of the literally 
physical and empirically demonstrable non-human and nonpolity 
world we call wilderness and to which the primary right refers.59  
Fifth, while the realist critique that exit is infeasible poses a 
significant threat to the cogency of traditional exit rights,60 it 
actually works in favor of the normative primary right.  Consider 
Christopher Eisgruber’s argument that the right to refuse to 
allow outsiders into a given polity seriously undermines the 
validity of the “choice” to remain in or exit from one’s own polity, 
thereby posing a significant challenge to traditional exit theory: 
[The] Consent Principle ignores the consent of the excluded. In a 
world without scarcity, that omission might be excusable.  We 
might imagine individuals banding together voluntarily in a 
Lockean wilderness, free to take what they wanted so long as 
they honored the Lockean proviso’s instruction to leave ‘enough 
and as good . . . for others.’  In such a world, I could not object if 
you refused to admit me into your society. You could demand that 
I find friends of my own and form another society elsewhere - and 
the demand that I go elsewhere would not be onerous since, by 
hypothesis, elsewhere would be ‘enough and as good’ as what you 
have. But ours is a world of scarcity; after Americans claim their 
nation’s bounty, there is not ‘enough and as good’ left for the rest 
of humanity. When we exclude others, they do have reason to 
complain.61 
In contrast to traditional exit rights, Eisgruber’s argument 
actually supports a primary right claim because the difficulty of 
exit acts as a reason that we ought to protect and further the 
primary right.  The sort of scarcity Eisgruber refers to is not an 
inevitable condition.  Rather, both the difficulty of leaving one’s 
own society and the limitations on places one can go are the 
 
 59. See Ilya Somin, Revitalizing Consent, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 753, 783 
(2000) (arguing in favor of one’s right to exit by opting out of paying taxes for 
and receiving the benefits of particular state programs). 
 60. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Constitutional Rights of Private 
Governments, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 144, 165 (2003). 
 61. Christopher L. Eisgruber, Birthright Citizenship and the Constitution, 72 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 54, 68 (1997). 
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product of a failure to protect the in vacuis locis that the primary 
right demands. 
III. The Primary Right Requires Access to 
Wilderness 
A. The “State Of Nature” Is a Literal Wilderness 
That we ought to be able to withdraw consent and leave 
polities, and that we might call that right primary in some sense 
is not particularly exciting.  But, if we accept that autonomy and 
meaningful consent require an option to exit all polities, we must 
consider how that option is realized.  How can an individual walk 
away from one polity without joining any other system of rights 
or duties?  Must one go to sea to establish new political 
communities, as modern day “seasteaders” suggest?62  What 
would prevent states from eventually extending their borders 
seaward to prevent that? In answering this question – which, 
until now, has remained largely unaddressed in our literature – 
we find a connection between the quote from Thoreau at the very 
beginning of this essay, Locke’s ideas about consent, and 
Rousseau’s primitive contract; that connection lies in what may 
be called nature, non-polity, or the non-human world. 
Liberalism draws its origins from Locke’s conceptual model 
describing the shift from the state of nature to governed states.  
Yet, despite the glaring presence of the concept of nature (a space 
that is not merely pre-government, but also pre-political) in that 
model, liberalism has failed to recognize the distinction Thoreau 
saw between “absolute freedom and wildness, as contrasted with 
a freedom and culture merely civil.”63  In this section, I will argue 
that for Locke, nature or wilderness was an essential component 
of consent which legitimated polities, or the exercise of power.  It 
constituted the preexisting default backdrop, or primary state of 
affairs, against which inter-personal relations were structured.  
For Locke, the option to exit, or to withhold consent, was realized 
in the existence of a state of nature – a literal, physical space in 
the natural world: wilderness. 
 
 62. See THE SEASTEADING INSTITUTE, supra note 6. 
 63. Thoreau, supra note 1. 
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Locke describes the state of nature for persons as “a state of 
perfect freedom to order their actions, and dispose of their 
possessions and persons, as they think fit, within the bounds of 
the law of nature, without asking leave, or depending upon the 
will of any other man.”64  It was a place “free and unpossessed”65 
in which there were few others to compete with for the “vast 
[w]ilderness of the [e]arth.”66 Locke writes, “there could be then 
little room for [q]uarrels or [c]ontentions about [p]roperty so 
establish[e]d. . . . Nor was this appropriation . . . any prejudice to 
any other [m]an, since there was still enough, and as good left; 
and more than the as yet unprovided could use.”67  Most 
significantly, he writes that in the original state of nature the act 
of social compact was one which “any number of men may do 
because it injures not the [f]reedom of the rest; they are left as 
they were in the [l]iberty of the [s]tate of [n]ature.”68 
The existence of a “residual state of nature”69 was clearly a 
necessary condition for the social compact to be legitimately 
based on consent.  Only because individuals had the option not to 
join the social compact, could individuals be bound by the social 
compact without its infringing upon their autonomy.  Thus, we 
can reasonably infer that Locke’s theory of political authority 
presumes a right to completely exit all polities.70  The residual 
state of nature is wilderness, and without it social compacts 
cannot be the product of consent, and become illegitimate. 
This interpretation is supported by Locke’s writings about 
America and by the tradition of thought taken up by the Framers 
to justify declaring independence and to distinguish their conduct 
from acts of treason – i.e., the mutinous overthrow of the 
government – against England.  Locke saw America, in all its 
 
 64. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 8 (C.B. Macpherson ed., 
1980) (emphasis added). 
 65. LOCKE, supra note 35, ¶ 121. 
 66. Id. ¶ 36. 
 67. Id. ¶¶ 31, 33 (emphasis added). 
 68. Id. ¶ 95. 
 69. See Carter J. Dillard, Rethinking the Procreative Right, 10 YALE HUM. 
RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1, 42-44 (2007). 
 70. Id. 
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wildness, as a “second Garden of Eden,”71 arguably synonymous 
with, or at least close to, a residual state of nature.  It seems 
reasonable that if Locke’s conception of the state of nature had 
nothing to do with wilderness and could just as easily be achieved 
by the dissolution of a government in Europe, he would not have 
made the distinction between America and Europe.  Locke’s state 
of nature was a physical, rather than an exclusively juridical, 
concept that was virtually synonymous with the absence of other 
persons’ control and influence.72  The fact that he saw America as 
empty (rightly or wrongly) obviously mattered to him. 
The Framers relied heavily on Locke’s ideas,73  asserting 
their right under the laws of nature to declare independence.  
Inspired by Locke’s promise of a land “free and unpossessed,” 
they assumed “among the powers of the earth, the separate and 
equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God 
entitle them,” in order to “institute new Government.”74  Clearly, 
the Framers read in Locke’s theory a right to return to the state 
of nature, to opt out of existing political systems, rather than a 
right merely to join some then-existing polity other than England.  
It was central to justifying their act of constituting a legitimate 
new government that they viewed the New World as essentially 
in vacuis locis, where they were under Natural Law and from 
which they could opt into a new social compact. 
Whether the Framers respected the possibility of humans’ 
autonomy from each other enough to preserve the non-human 
world or not is irrelevant.  The point is that they actually 
practiced something very much like the right.  They did so, but 
without the safeguards and the correct structure of rights and 
duties to ensure that others in the future could do the same, and 
perhaps a better job of it. 
 
 71. BARBARA ARNEIL, JOHN LOCKE AND AMERICA: THE DEFENCE OF ENGLISH 
COLONIALISM 72, 110-11 (1996). 
 72. See generally Dillard, supra note 69. 
 73. Edward S. Corwin, The ‘Higher Law’ Background of American 
Constitutional Law, 42 HARV. L. REV. 365, 383 (1929) (“The conveyance of 
natural law ideas into American constitutional theory was the work 
preeminently – though by no means exclusively – of John Locke's Second 
Treatise on Civil Government . . . .”). 
 74. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 1, 2 (U.S. 1776). 
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Regardless, it is clear, first, that Locke envisioned that some 
would consent to the compact while others might not, instead 
choosing to remain in a state of nature, to literally remain in the 
natural world outside all human polities; and, two, that Lockean 
consent requires, therefore, the option to remain in the state of 
nature.  More specifically, Lockean consent requires the option to 
remain in, or return to, the wilderness. 
But somehow in the hundreds of years over which Locke’s 
state of nature model has been developed and built upon, 
liberalism has obscured the connection between meaningful 
consent to be governed and nature in the sense of the non-human 
natural world, or wilderness.  Nature, as it appears in the concept 
“state of nature,” always seems to remain an abstract component 
for theorists.  It became and remains synonymous with an 
abstract original condition: 
For Locke, Kant, and Rawls, not only is the state of nature 
primary, in the sense of coming first in order either historically 
or conceptually, but conclusions derived from it are also primary, 
in the sense of coming first in predominance.  Or, as Dworkin 
would have it, institutions, and ideas that come later in order 
than those derived from the abstract original condition are 
always to be tested against, subjected to, and vulnerable to being 
‘trumped’ by the principles derived from the abstract original 
condition.75 
Why should the “state of nature” be reduced to an “abstract 
original condition?”  The physical, primitive, non-human world – 
or what we call wilderness – seems like the antithesis of abstract. 
Nature is certainly less abstract than things like the social 
compact, human institutions, and law itself.  Again, wilderness is 
the physical manifestation of the original condition, the 
possibility of being able to break off from other persons and 
become autonomous (singular) because one is not hopelessly 
surrounded by them.  Isn’t it reasonable that “the state of nature” 
means exactly what it says and that it refers to a moment in 
human development when the natural world dominated humans 
 
 75. Peter Stillman, Hegel's Analysis of Property in The Philosophy of Right, 
10 CARDOZO L. REV. 1031, 1038-39 (1989). 
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and controlled the human condition no less than for any other 
species? 
Where else but the non-human world or wilderness can one 
be free from what Locke called the “Will of any other Man” 
including the changes others make and influences they have upon 
the world?  Is real property the best version of nature and the 
non-human that liberalism can offer us, so that wilderness is 
reduced to one’s backyard?  And if nature, as used in the “state of 
nature,” means not just the absence of particular juridical human 
relations, but also the literal presence of wilderness rather than 
civilizing influence of man, what does that mean for liberalism’s 
principle that humans ought to be able to walk away, to be let 
alone and autonomous, by refusing to consent to the control and 
influence of others?  Polities are meant to give humans the 
benefits they cannot get in the wilderness, not take away the 
benefits they had in wilderness by eradicating it. 
B. Defining Wilderness 
For the purposes of this essay, it is most useful to conceive of 
wilderness as a physical space absent of human power, control, 
and influence, or an objective backdrop free of human 
subjectivity.  Here we have to be careful to avoid what I will call 
the “territory trap,” or the learned inclination to see physical and 
juridical space as a defined territory surrounded by other defined 
territories.  Moving what remains of wilderness into such a 
territory would entail significant human influence, in 
contravention of the right.  Rather, limited human polities must 
form in, and be surrounded by, the backdrop or default of 
wilderness.  Non-polity is the space between.  That is the only 
way the right works, and reasonable access to something at least 
approaching the ideal of the non-human world is ensured.  It is 
not unlike the world today, with human polities divided by oceans 
that are, or until the past several decades were, largely non-
human. 
Such an approach comports not only with Locke’s ideas about 
the state of nature, but also with more modern views and uses of 
the term.  The Wilderness Act of 1964 and its precursors draw 
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their theoretical origins from the wilderness movement, a social 
movement that strove towards “liberal perfectionism”76 and 
conceived of wilderness as an “environment of solitude.”77  
Wilderness initially received legal protection in the 1920’s under 
a Forest Service regulation creating and setting aside certain 
“primitive areas.”78 
But the Wilderness Act of 1964 goes further in stating that 
the express purpose of the Act is “to assure that an increasing 
population, accompanied by expanding settlement and growing 
mechanization, does not occupy and modify all areas within the 
United States . . . .”79  Toward that end, it finds that “[a] 
wilderness, in contrast with those areas where man and his own 
works dominate the landscape, is hereby recognized as an area 
where the earth and its community of life are untrammeled by 
man, where man himself is a visitor who does not remain.”80  The 
definition is further refined later in the Act to describe land 
“retaining its primeval character and influence,”81 affected 
“primarily by the forces of nature, with the imprint of man’s work 
substantially unnoticeable,”82 and which “has outstanding 
opportunities for solitude or a primitive and unconfined type of 
recreation.”83  Similarly, the Endangered Species Act’s primary 
purposes are to “provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon 
which endangered species and threatened species depend may be 
conserved, [and] to provide a program for the conservation of such 
endangered species and threatened species.”84 
Significantly, the Wilderness Act does not require wilderness 
to be a space absolutely devoid of humanity.  The Act expressly 
recognizes that wilderness areas must be managed and 
presupposes that wilderness areas exist within the jurisdiction of 
 
 76. Jedediah Purdy, The Politics of Nature: Returning Democracy to 
Environmental Law, 119 YALE L.J. 1122, 1161 (2010). 
 77. Id. at 1165. 
 78. Peter A. Appel, Wilderness and the Courts, 29 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 62, 71 
(2010). 
 79. Wilderness Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a) (2006). 
 80. Id. § 1131(c). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Endangered Species Act § 2(b), 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2006). 
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a given polity.  Likewise, the Endangered Species Act provides for 
the careful management and conservation of species within a 
polity, not unfettered access to complete biodiversity and its 
sufficient natural habitat.  I am not suggesting that either the 
Wilderness or the Endangered Species Acts enshrine the primary 
right – that would be an odd assertion in light of what I have said 
about the antecedent nature of the right.  Rather, like the Court’s 
use of the concept of privacy, I suggest that with these Acts, 
Congress recognized a spectrum of human control and influence 
on the non-human world and the value of creating duties on 
others to ensure access to places and species under relatively 
little human control and influence. 
C. The Primary Right Is Not So Special After All: 
Positive Law, Like The Primary Right, Protects 
Wilderness 
We can define the particular duties created by the primary 
right, keeping in mind that, like all general statements of rights 
out of the context in which they are applied, the description is 
merely a placeholder.  This is especially true of the primary right, 
where properly balancing it against competing interests will 
involve empirical analyses across many disciplines.  Regardless, 
we can initially think of the primary right as an individual’s 
general claim-right to duties of noninterference by others with (1) 
the rightholders’ reasonable access to wilderness, as well as (2) 
access to complete biodiversity and its sufficient natural 
habitat.85  The right is paired with the same dual correlative 
duties on the rightholder not to influence others.  The latter duty 
preserves the biodiversity of the non-human world, wilderness 
writ large;86 the former preserves its local representation.  The 
duty to not interfere with reasonable access allows persons the 
“genuine alternative choice” that Dworkin refers to above,87 
allowing meaningful consent to the polity they are in.  Together, 
these related duties protect the necessary conditions and the 
 
 85. See supra Part III. 
 86. By “writ large” I mean the wilderness or nonhuman as it exists 
throughout the world as opposed to locally or in one place. 
 87. Dworkin, supra note 45. 
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tangible places and things, which make the act of consent to 
polities of persons possible, because one cannot consent to other 
persons’ influence and control if no alternative exists.  The right 
involves many more Hohfeldian relations88 that will not be 
discussed here. 
These duties (which work in favor of one another, with access 
promoting the creation of wilderness and vice versa) break up a 
more general duty not to interfere with access to the non-human 
world, ensuring the possibility of exit from all polities and thus 
places from which to consent to human power, control, and 
influence.  What then is the non-human world in a world filled 
with billions of humans?  Presumably, since the word human 
generally refers to our species, the term “non-human” refers to all 
other species in existence, and the term “world” refers to the 
physical locations in which they live, or their natural habitats 
(this is, incidentally, the general approach taken in the 
Endangered Species Act).  So, to preserve access to the non-
human world requires preservation of non-human species and 
their habitats.  Why must the biodiversity be complete?  
Remember how the concept “wilderness” works in the primary 
right – it is in part a theoretical ideal but also refers to actual 
places in the world, much the way free speech is an ideal but also 
refers to the actual speech that is permitted once the ideal is 
balanced against other values, like national security.  The ideal of 
wilderness in the primary right is the far end of the spectrum of 
human influence, an ideal which makes thinking about how one 
place is more wild than another possible.  The ideal is the 
complete non-human world, or complete biodiversity and its 
sufficient natural habitat, but that ideal is then balanced against 
the human polities in that world, much like the ideal of free 
speech is balanced against the ideal of national security.  Each 
must make room for the other.  Again, the picture that will 
emerge then is not a state called Wilderness, to which all of the 
non-human world has been relegated, but polities in a sea of 
wilderness, islands of consensual human political association in a 
sea of non-polity. 
 
 88. Regarding the constituent elements of legal rights generally, see Wesley 
Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial 
Reasoning, in FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS 65 (1923). 
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Another way to think of rights as ideals is to consider how we 
compensate persons whose rights have been violated.  It is 
physically impossible to restore a person who has been tortured to 
the state of affairs they were in before the torture.  But we use 
that theoretical state of affairs, or alternatively the state of 
affairs they would have been in had they not been tortured, as an 
ideal when determining how they are to be compensated for the 
violation of their right not to be tortured.  The same can be done 
with the primary right – we can use an ideal non-human world to 
practically reason in that direction. 
It is vital to see that we currently live under positive legal 
duties, backed by force, that point towards something like the 
norm I am calling the primary right.  Wilderness, as used in the 
Wilderness Act of 1964, required that wilderness areas be 
“administered for the use and enjoyment of the American people 
in such manner as will leave them unimpaired for future use and 
enjoyment as wilderness, and so as to provide for the protection of 
these areas.”89  Both it and the Endangered Species Act are 
enforceable, under penalty, by federal agencies.90 
Analogues to these duties exist in international law.  
Instruments such as the Convention Concerning the Protection of 
the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, the Convention on 
Biological Diversity, the Stockholm Declaration of the United 
Nations on the Human Environment, the Convention on 
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and 
Flora, the Convention on Nature Protection and Wild Life 
Preservation in the Western Hemisphere, among others, seek to 
protect the non-human world.91 
 
 89. 16 U.S.C. § 1131(a) (2006). 
 90. See generally 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531—44 (2006); 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131—1136 
(2006). 
 91. See, e.g., Convention on Biological Diversity, pmbl., Jan. 5, 1992, 1960 
U.N.T.S. 1087 (“[C]onservation of biological diversity is a common concern of 
humankind . . . .”); U.N. Envtl. Programme, Declaration of the United Nations 
Conference on the Human Environment, June 16, 1972, available at 
http://www.unep.org/Documents/Default.asp?DocumentID=97&ArticleID=1503; 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and 
Flora, pmbl., Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087 (“Recognizing that wild fauna and 
flora in their many beautiful and varied forms are an irreplaceable part of the 
natural systems of the earth which must be protected for this and the 
generations to come . . . .”); Convention for the Protection and Preservation of 
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To be clear, while there are duties imposed on us by positive 
law that parallel the core duties that make up the primary right 
(and other areas of law we would not immediately think of and 
which will not be discussed here, like the common law of false 
imprisonment), the primary right – like other fundamental 
human rights – need not rely on positive law.  The primary right 
provides a theoretical basis for and explains positive law norms, 
and its reflection in positive law is evidence of the right.  
However, the right is not contingent on positive law.  The state 
cannot give that which comes before it.  Whether it was the 
Framers seeing themselves as having found a state of nature in 
which to form a new polity, or wilderness advocates creating 
primitive spaces away from others, both represent moves along 
the same spectrum.  The far end of that spectrum would be the 
total absence of human control and influence, and that concept –  
even if theoretical – acts as a point from which to measure, 
whether we are measuring the imposition of a noisy road in 
woods we occupy, or the threat of foreign soldiers crossing our 
border to enforce a tax.  Without that point we have no absolute 
from which to measure the degree to which others control and 
influence us – a frightening prospect if one values the bare 
autonomy of being “let alone,” the value of complete exit from all 
polities.  Wilderness, or the ideal of the far end of the spectrum 
(as opposed to federal wilderness areas or the Framers’ America) 
is thus the value – part and parcel of consent – at the base of the 
primary right. 
 
the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, pmbl., Nov. 23, 1972, 27 U.S.T. 37 
(“Considering that deterioration or disappearance of any item of the cultural or 
natural heritage constitutes a harmful impoverishment of the heritage of all the 
nations of the world”); Convention on Nature Protection and Wild Life 
Preservation in the Western Hemisphere, pmbl., Oct. 12, 1940, 56 Stat. 1354 
(“Wishing to protect and preserve scenery of extraordinary beauty, unusual and 
striking geologic formations, regions and natural objects of aesthetic, historic or 
scientific value, and areas characterized by primitive conditions.”). 
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IV. THE PRIMARY RIGHT IN ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW THEORY 
A. Linking Liberal Political Exit Theory and 
Normative Environmental Law Theory 
To date, the fields of liberal political exit theory and 
normative environmental law theory (if not environmental ethics 
more generally), have remained essentially separate.  It is true 
that others have posited forms of complete exit.  For example, 
Abner Greene refers to “complete exit” when discussing the 
withdrawal of religious communities like the Amish.92  Perhaps 
Nicolaus Tideman makes the argument closest to mine in his 
article Secession as a Human Right,93 which derives a compelling 
argument for a right to secede from the premise that people have 
rights to themselves.  However, none of these arguments ground 
the right in wilderness or bare autonomy, instead connecting the 
right to environmental ethics. 
It is also true that environmental law theory has gone so far 
as to assert that wilderness can further human freedom, but it 
has not treated such freedom as a form of autonomy that grounds 
a first generation human right.  Rather, the approach has relied 
on instrumentalist and utilitarian arguments to support the 
claim.  For example, James Huffman and others have explored 
the direct relationship between the concepts of freedom and 
wilderness,94 but their arguments are premised upon a particular 
political system (e.g. the United States) and seem to proceed from 
essentially instrumentalist claims for protecting wilderness: 
wilderness should be protected because its continued existence 
facilitates particular values other than bare autonomy and 
consent to political association, be it the failed form of autonomy 
(loss of wilderness narrows the total range of human choices),95 
 
 92. Abner S. Greene, Kiryas Joel and Two Mistakes about Equality, 96 
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 6 (1996). 
 93. See generally Nicolaus Tideman, Secession as a Human Right, 1 J. MORAL 
PHIL. 19 (2004). 
 94. See James Huffman, Wilderness and Freedom, 16 IDAHO L. REV. 407 
(1980). 
 95. See Laurence H. Tribe, Ways Not to Think About Plastic Trees: New 
Foundations for Environmental Law, 83 YALE L.J. 1315, 1326-27 (1974); Shea 
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equal protection,96 or the First Amendment.97  Indeed, the 
relationship between wilderness and freedom has been so 
“instrumentalized” as to suggest that it can be quantified and 
traded in a market system.98  Such arguments can be problematic 
because they often view liberal principles as competing against 
wilderness values, or because they are based on the rights of 
future generations.99 
Moreover, where environmental ethics and human rights 
have intersected, the claim is to a very different human right 
than the one advanced here: a right to an environment adequate 
to human health and well-being, or a clean and safe 
environment.100  Other attempts to articulate a human right to 
the environment also usually sound in the area of so-called 
“second generation rights,” which are less accepted as “rights” to 
begin with than civil and political rights, and which are valued 
progressively rather than absolutely, making these claims weaker 
tools for environmental law than the primary right. 
By linking environmental ethics and political exit theory, the 
primary right can help environmental scholars facing the 
difficulty of finding an objective theoretical foundation or baseline 
for protecting the environment – but using the primary right in 
this sense will not go without criticism.  A. Dan Tarlock has 
 
Coulson, Liberty, Property, and the Environment: Rethinking Environmental 
Law in Canada, 26 WINDSOR REV. LEGAL & SOC. ISSUES 49, 65-67 (2009). 
 96. See A. Dan Tarlock, A Wilderness. Bill of Rights, by William O. Douglas, 
19 STAN. L. REV. 895 (1967) (book review). 
 97. Scholars who see the First Amendment as a source for environmental 
protection espouse, for example, the value of “an understanding of the true 
relationship between man and nature.”  See Carole Gallagher, The Movement to 
Create an Environmental Bill of Rights: From Earth Day, 1970 to the Present, 9 
FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 107 (1997). 
 98. See generally Jan G. Laitos & Rachael B. Gamble, The Problem with 
Wilderness, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 503 (2008); PARTHA DASGUPTA, HUMAN 
WELL-BEING AND THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT (2004). 
 99. See, e.g., Martin Schonfeld, Population Growth and the Preservation of 
Wilderness, 31 J. SOC. PHIL. 414, 414-28 (2001). 
 100. See, e.g., James Nickel, The Human Right to a Safe Environment: 
Philosophical Perspectives on its Scope and Justification, 18 YALE J. INT’L L. 281 
(2003); TIM HAYWARD, CONSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS 1 (2005); Luis E. 
Rodriguez-Rivera, Is the Human Right to Environment Recognized Under 
International Law? It Depends on the Source, 12 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 
1, 19 (2001). 
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argued that environmental law is incompatible with our U.S. 
constitutional jurisprudence because the environment, rather 
than human dignity, is the focal point of environmental 
protection, and because environmental regulation calls for 
affirmative state action (positive rights) rather than preventing 
state oppression (negative rights).101 
Kent Greenawalt goes further, arguing that a religious or 
non-rational basis is needed to support environmental protection 
because: 
[u]nless one puts the justification in terms of psychological health 
or in terms of a needed corrective to present human ignorance of 
future possibilities, the claim that people should respect nature 
in its own right and should try to preserve species is not one that 
can be grounded successfully in rational argument.102 
In arguing that a non-rational or religious foundation is 
appropriate, Greenawalt asks: 
If crushing one stone raises no moral question, why does 
destroying the Grand Canyon raise a question except in terms of 
aesthetic and other losses to people and to other creatures 
warranting moral consideration?  Why should the life of one 
nearly extinct snail darter count for more than the life of one 
salmon, if the salmon’s capacities are at least as great?103 
There have been many attempts to circumvent this problem.  
With regard to wilderness areas, some have argued for assigning 
property rights to wilderness areas, which could then be traded in 
the market.104  Jedediah Purdy has attempted to revise our 
conventional approach to environmental law without resorting to 
market solutions by arguing that our historic discourse about the 
 
 101. See A. Dan Tarlock, Is There a There There in Environmental Law?, 19 J. 
LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 213, 223-26 (2004). 
 102. Kent Greenawalt, The Limits of Rationality and the Place of Religious 
Conviction: Protecting Animals and the Environment, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1011, 1039 (1986). 
 103. Id. at 1037. 
 104. Laitos & Gamble, supra note 98. 
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value of protecting the environment is sufficient to generate 
democratic change.105 
In contrast to these, the primary right approach claims 
access to wilderness and its local representation as an objective 
human right (or meta-human right, as described above), 
irrespective of subjective market preference or the democratic 
process.  The basis for the right is not religion, but the value of 
autonomy that can exist only through the uniquely objective 
concept of wilderness.  Wilderness is not an instrument for 
autonomy; rather, it is the physical realization of the entirely 
secular value of bare autonomy and meaningful consent, which 
are purely rational, liberal, and political values.  Wilderness must 
be preserved because without it one could not revoke one’s 
consent to be subjected to others’ influence.  To respond to 
Tarlock’s point, what value is more central to human dignity than 
autonomy – the ability and praxis of declining other persons’ 
control and influence in order to self-determine?  And why would 
I care if the persons forcing themselves on me are representatives 
of the state or fellow citizens?  It is the imposition of power or 
polity that matters, not who is imposing.106 
Furthermore, to Greenawalt’s point, destroying the Grand 
Canyon raises more of a question than crushing a stone because 
of the great degree of influence the act would have on the non-
human world and thus persons right to leave all polities and 
access it.  That is why climate change is so offensive to those who 
love wilderness – it represents such a loss of bare autonomy in a 
world from which we can exercise the possibility of consent to 
influence by others, or to instead be let alone. 
Thinking along these lines may give the best reasons to 
justify things like the September 10, 2008 acquittal of six 
Greenpeace activists charged with intentionally damaging the 
 
 105. Purdy, supra note 76. 
 106. Alternatively, we can evade the state versus private actor distinction by 
noting that the state has monopolized the right to use the violence we would 
otherwise use against the offending private actors, and therefore become 
complicit. 
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UK coal-fired power station at Kingsnorth.107  While the jury may 
have been persuaded by the defense’s arguments about the 
activists’ preventing the greater harm to property caused by 
climate change, a better moral justification might have been that 
the operators of the plant had crossed a theoretical threshold and 
were violating the primary right. 
B. Solving Environmental Law Theory: Of Baselines 
and Wilderness 
By now it should be obvious that a strong candidate for a 
baseline of environmental regulation is the background 
environment itself, both the one in which humans occupy, and the 
non-human world.  But, where on the continuum of human 
power, control and influence, do we draw the boundaries of the 
primary right?  As with any right, bright-line boundaries are 
difficult to establish in the abstract.  That said, I suggest we can 
draw a line around that which is reasonably necessary to 
preserve an exit option out of human polities and into the 
wilderness.  This requires at least two things: preventing the loss 
of other species in their natural habitat with whom one can 
interact (especially as those species evolve), and ensuring that 
access to local wilderness areas is at least reasonable (for 
example, reachable by a short drive).  This would allow persons 
who do not consent to the dominant influence of other persons to 
exit, while allowing for all the other forms of human activity we 
find valuable.  Again, unlike Purdy’s approach, the primary right 
approach treats the imperative to preserve and restore wilderness 
as an objective fact of human autonomy, not subject to the 
opinions of others in political or economic markets. 
The one variable that might make reasonable access to 
wilderness impossible, human population, would of course have to 
be taken into account.  While it is often unclear what one means 
by overpopulation (begging the question over what), the primary 
right provides a useful standard: again, do you, at this moment, 
as you read these lines, have reasonable access to the nonhuman 
 
 107. See John Vidal, Climb Every Chimney, THE GUARDIAN, Sept. 12, 2008, 
available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2008/sep/12/activists. 
kingsnorth. 
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world?  We can easily speculate how much easier the right would 
be to protect and further, for all of us, had human population not 
sextupled in the Twentieth century alone.  That said, the fact 
that the primary right may not be fully realized because of 
human population levels does not make the imperative to strive 
for the ideal any less absolute.  According to Daniel Farber, “most 
constitutional rights represent baselines that are subject to 
override, but only by particularly powerful government interests.  
For example, the First Amendment does not create an absolute 
right, but the norm of free speech nonetheless functions as a 
powerful baseline.”108  The norm, or ideal, of free speech that 
Farber describes is the theoretical point from which claims to a 
right to free speech are launched, and from which fulfillment of 
the right is measured.  In the same way, wilderness is the norm, 
or ideal, from which claims to the primary right are launched, 
and from which fulfillment of the right is measured. 
Farber critiques Cass Sunstein’s use of a neutral baseline in 
evaluating environmental regulation.  Sunstein objects to the 
idea that “the interest in clean air and water, and in a safe 
workplace, should be seen as a ‘right’ in the sense of something 
that will not be balanced against other social interests.”109  
Instead, for Sunstein there is no presumptive allocation of 
entitlements, and individual interests in polluting or preserving 
the environment are weighed equally.  Farber analogizes this 
approach to Ronald Coase’s objection “to the notion that someone 
making an intrusive noise should be seen as invading the rights 
of a neighbor; the neighbor can equally well be seen to be 
invading the noisemaker’s rights by demanding quiet.”110  Farber 
asserts that Sunstein’s neutral baseline for evaluating 
environmental law flies in the face of “the two primary interests 
deserving of protection” that Sunstein himself identifies: human 
welfare and autonomy.111  Farber points out, “someone who has 
developed cancer, as a result of involuntary environmental 
 
 108. Daniel Farber, Playing the Baseline: Civil Rights, Environmental Law, 
and Statutory Interpretation, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 676, 685 (1991). 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 686. 
 111. Id. at 687. 
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exposure, has also suffered very serious losses of welfare and 
autonomy.”112 
Contrast Sunstein’s approach with the primary right 
approach.  Using the norm of reasonable access to wilderness 
(defined to require complete biodiversity and its sufficient natural 
habitat) as a baseline, the primary right would guide many 
regulatory outcomes for air and water quality, especially where 
the behavior at issue has global impacts, like carbon emissions, 
upon the litmus paper represented by wilderness.  Similarly, the 
primary right would favor the sounds in wilderness over Coase’s 
noisemaker, an advertiser wishing to blast commercials via 
loudspeakers into the Gila Wilderness for example. In other 
words, hikers trump snowmobilers. 
And yet, the primary right approach also has the advantage 
of being truly neutral.  Unlike Sunstein and Coase’s seemingly 
neutral system, the primary right uses the non-subjective non-
human world as a starting point.  Even using regulatory, 
statutory, or constitutional baselines, as Sunstein does elsewhere, 
seems arbitrarily subjective (favoring one group over another) 
relative to the immaculate pre-human neutrality of wilderness.  
In a world of competition between various subjective uses of 
scarce resources, non-use is more equitable than any particular 
use because it is the only choice that avoids favoring one human 
over another, by instead linking the decision to and favoring the 
non-human, or that which came before the various subjective 
uses.  The fact that non-use may coincide with some humans’ 
preference is irrelevant – the decision is based on the original 
state of the resources.  Like an adult settling a dispute between 
children over a piece of cake, it really is a fair choice to say that 
none may have it. 
 Consider in this regard the common debate over whether 
wilderness and the non-human world ought to be valued 
instrumentally or intrinsically.  The primary right allows us to 
exit the “intrinsic versus instrumental” debate by providing a 
unique, third way of valuing wilderness, seeing it as “objectively 
valuable.”  Wilderness is objective not just in the sense that we 
can objectively verify human influence in the non-human world, 
 
 112. Id. 
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or even in the sense that wilderness has objectively intrinsic or 
instrumental value, but in the sense that wilderness or any other 
natural resource is an object with the potential to be converted to 
any number of uses, each subjectively valuable to different groups 
of humans users.113  The default state of the world, however, is 
unconverted, natural wilderness.  An unused natural resource, a 
nonpolity, or a place in a state of wilderness, is thus objective or 
neutral, relative to the various subjective uses to which it could 
be put.  In this sense wilderness is “objectively valuable” because 
it has not been reduced to a subjective use.  When we alter the 
non-human we are not just dominating it, but dominating others 
who might have appreciated its objective state. 
C. Dividing Environmental from Non-Human Law 
Much of the confusion described above could be attributed to 
simple semantics. Interior decorators use the term 
“environment,” but it hardly seems fitting to treat the 
preservation of species and their habitats in the same vein as 
where we place rugs and light fixtures.  We might therefore call 
the creation of a manicured park, which seems to be at best a 
Platonic imitation of the non-human world, an improvement in 
the environment.  But by calling the regulation of humans with 
the non-human world “environmental law,” we immediately treat 
the world as a singular environment and erase the human and 
nonhuman divide – conceptually erasing the non-human world, 
the world before humans, entirely.  It becomes “ours,” the 
presumed consenters’, communal environment to treat.  As 
discussed below, this is a convenient frame for polluters and 
tends to make invisible key factors that degrade the non-human 
world like population growth.  Changing the frame to non-human 
law preserves, in the term itself, the subject of the law’s 
protection. 
 
 113. Obviously, non-human animals use natural resources.  However, they 
will not be discussed here, primarily because non-human animals are generally 
not seen as capable of creating social contracts. 
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V. COUNTERARGUMENTS AND FREQUENTLY 
ASKED QUESTIONS 
Some will claim that the primary right is not something 
people want – that it is not preferred enough over conflicting 
interests to survive market choices and the democratic process.  
But the claim that the primary right ought to be respected is a 
thoroughly first generation (political) human rights argument for 
protecting the non-human world.  The rights-based argument is 
premised upon the intrinsic worth of autonomy and consent, and 
the wilderness that is necessary to protect these values.  It posits 
that autonomy is a non-commensurable value that trumps 
subjective preference, instrumental value, and the maximization 
of utility.  As such, just as the right to vote is not contingent on 
what the majority thinks or people actually voting, the primary 
right is not defeated by counterarguments about personal 
preference. 
Modern authority has breezed past the requirements of the 
primary right so much so that the claims made herein will appear 
fantastical to the average thinker, more than some minds (the 
sort that believe in “green consumption”) can take in as 
Tocqueville wrote of early Americans: 
To break through almost impenetrable forests, to cross deep 
rivers, to brave pestilential marshes . . . those are exertions that 
the American readily contemplates, if it is a question of earning a 
guinea; for that is the point. But that one should do such things 
from curiosity is more than his mind can take in.114 
Many persons simply do not have the disposition or capacity 
to respect particular rights.115  They must assert their will upon 
the world and cannot simply let others alone.  We should not 
expect them to do so.  That is the whole point – I need not expect 
 
 114. Purdy, supra note 76, at 1140 (citing ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, JOURNEY TO 
AMERICA 335 (J.P. Mayer ed., George Lawrence trans., 1962) (1959)). 
 115. See, e.g., Greenawalt, supra note 89, at 1021-22 (“[P]erhaps only human 
beings with a minimal level of moral capacity . . . may qualify as bearers of 
rights who are owed justice.”).  The author continues by stating, “Moreover, an 
attitude that animals and nature are not to be dominated contributes to less 
domineering and aggressive attitudes among people and thus enhances human 
social existence.”  Id. at 1024. 
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them to cease from asserting their will on me or others, or feel the 
need to waste my time convincing them to do so, because I need 
not deal with them at all.  I should be able to walk away from 
them and their influence, making them irrelevant without 
relation to me.  Their incapacity, their inability to practice 
relative noninterference, does not defeat the right.  The rights-
based argument treats the value upon which the right is based, 
autonomy, as a non-commensurable liberal value that trumps 
subjective preference and the maximization of total utility. 
That said, the primary right is not simply an attempt to hoist 
libertarians opposed to environmental protections on their own 
petard, nor to work a reductio on liberal political thought, nor to 
default to the remaining generation of human rights argument, 
by claiming that second and third generation arguments for the 
natural environment have largely failed (especially in light of our 
inability to regulate anthropogenic causes of climate change).  
Rather, it is an honest attempt to explore the meanings and 
limits of autonomy and consent, proceeding from a human rights 
framework of assumptions. 
There would no doubt be desirable consequences in 
protecting the right, relevant to climate change, urban sprawl, 
the loss of species, and the spread of toxins; this would also 
include social changes, not the least of which would be how 
thoughtful persons come about bringing others into the world.  
Further, it seems obvious that any collection of political systems 
will produce more utility if the polities within it are incentivized 
to attract members rather than compel their membership because 
no real alternatives exist.  Nevertheless, the arguments made 
herein spring from the intrinsic value of autonomy and consent, 
rather than the usefulness or instrumental value of having the 
right.  As such, the primary right is not particularly vulnerable to 
speculative counterarguments about the dangerous consequences 
of recognizing such a right, such as effects on economies. 
Another argument against the claims made herein is that 
realizing anything close to the primary right for all persons is 
simply infeasible.  This argument fails because it often presumes 
that the voluntary behavior most responsible for preventing 
access to the non-human world, the creation of humans or 
42http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol29/iss3/5
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unlimited human procreation, is somehow inevitable, like rain 
falling from the sky.  That is not the way having children works. 
The comeback then is usually that while limitless procreation 
may not be physically inevitable, the primary right remains 
infeasible because there is a personal, limitless right to procreate.  
This too fails because the primary right trumps any so-called 
unlimited right to procreate, a claim of right that is doomed to 
failure, both legally and morally.116  The primary right is feasible 
because of that trump, because the value it protects outweighs 
the only conflicting value it has to in order to be feasible in a 
logical ordering of rights and duties. 
Note that the primary right is in a way superior to other 
human rights and interests in that it is tied to a concretely 
tangible and objectively valuable thing – wilderness – rather than 
relatively abstract concepts like religion, privacy, or free speech.  
We can empirically measure the degree to which wilderness is 
lost, and the degree to which we have access to it, and hence the 
status of the right.  In this way it is a right built for praxis: the 
reader can decide now whether, and when, she or he will go 
experience the value, and where they will do it; she or he can also 
imagine what it would be like to live in a world where they could 
not do it, could not get away from others.   Again, do you, at this 
moment, as you read these lines, have reasonable access to the 
non-human world?  Because it corresponds to our experiences, 
you, the reader, can visualize it much more than you can 
visualize whether you enjoy other and more contingent 
 
 116. See Dillard, supra note 64; Carter Dillard, Valuing Having Children, 12 
J.L. & FAM. STUD. 151 (2010) (exploring self-replacement as the only defensible 
objective value underlying the moral right to procreate); Carter Dillard, Child 
Welfare and Future Persons, 43 GA. L. REV. 367 (2009) (demonstrating the moral 
and legal duty a prospective parent has to be fit when he or she has a child, a 
duty arising from or creating correlative claim-rights shared by the state and 
prospective children); Carter Dillard, Prospective Parents and the Children's 
Rights Convention, 25 AM. U. INT’L  L. REV. 485 (2010) (interpreting the 
Convention from a prospective-child-centered perspective, and exploring 
whether the Convention requires states to pursue policies that heighten 
prospective parents' perceptions of the duties they owe their prospective 
children before having them); Carter Dillard, Future Children as Property, 17 
DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 47 (2010) (arguing that the broad, modern, privacy-
based version of the right to procreate is in tension with an embedded 
constitutional principle that prohibits one class of persons (prospective parents) 
from treating another (prospective children) as property). 
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fundamental rights, like the right to counsel, to speak freely, or to 
be free of unlawful searches and seizures. 
 Contrast this with the praxis of the right to have as many 
children as you like, in whatever circumstances you wish: what 
concretely tangible and objectively valuable thing was Nadya 
Suleman, the so-called “Octomom,” pursuing by having fourteen 
children?117  Autonomy and privacy?  Was whatever valuable 
thing she sought more valuable than those aspects of the non-
human world that inspired our greatest works of art, poetry, and 
literature?  In contrast to more ethereal rights, the primary right 
is built upon the concrete and objectively valuable ideal of 
reasonable access to the non-human world.  I would rather share 
the world with spotted owls than the Duggars’ umpteen 
children,118 and, per the primary right, I have a right to do so. 
Thus, even though traditional environmental regulation has 
been derided as hopelessly anti-liberal, negative, and contrary to 
human dignity, the primary right is the opposite – encouraging 
and urging persons to exercise their autonomy from each other in 
order to experience the non-human world, and thus incentivizing 
polities to attract rather than compel membership.  If we honestly 
value polities created by consent then we value a world 
dominated by the natural spaces in between those polities, 
because those spaces give meaning to our active consent, our act 
of choosing. 
Perhaps the best challenge to the claim that non-polity or 
wilderness can act as a baseline for a human right, and for 
environmental regulation, is the assertion that wilderness simply 
does not exist, that any divide between the human and non-
human worlds is so obscure as to make wilderness an incoherent 
concept.119  William Cronon might be seen as taking this position 
in his famous essay, The Trouble With Wilderness.120  More than 
 
 117. See Ashley Surdin, Octuplet Mother Also Gives Birth to Ethical Debate, 
WASH. POST, Feb. 4, 2009, at C1. 
 118. See generally JIM BOB DUGGAR & MICHELLE DUGGAR, THE DUGGARS: 20 & 
COUNTING! RAISING ONE OF AMERICA’S LARGEST FAMILIES – HOW THEY DO IT 
(2008). 
 119. See, e.g., EMMA MARRIS, RAMBUNCTIOUS GARDEN: SAVING NATURE IN A 
POST-WILD WORLD (2011). 
 120. See William Cronon, The Trouble with Wilderness; or, Getting Back to the 
Wrong Nature, in UNCOMMON GROUND: TOWARD REINVENTING NATURE 69 
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one commentator has criticized environmentalists’ attachment to 
the human and non-human divide,121 calling the “wild” an “empty 
concept” and arguing that “[h]uman domination of earth’s 
ecosystems empties most of the meaning out of the concept of 
‘wild’ today.”122  They assert that wilderness is a profoundly 
subjective aesthetic, rather than objectively verifiable state of 
affairs.123  Others attack the divide as a social construct that 
distorts our view of reality and preserves legal doctrines, like the 
“Act of God” doctrine, that now make little sense, especially in 
light of anthropogenic climate change.124 
There is a suspicious undercurrent of hostility towards those 
who would protect the non-human from the human in these 
critiques, and one could not have designed a better gift for 
corporate polluters than a straight-faced argument that there is 
no “environment” left to be protected.  Regardless, these critiques 
do not pose a problem for the primary right for several reasons.  
First, these critiques usually conflate the ideas of the pre-human 
world with the non-human world; the primary right is based upon 
the latter, an ideal, as described below, one can practically reason 
about.  Similarly, they are incoherent to the extent that they are, 
themselves, premised on a logical distinction between the human 
and the non-human, as when one refers to “human domination of 
the earth’s ecosystems.”125  One extended critique sought to prove 
that the original state of nature never existed and thus that 
contemporary environmentalists should not try to restore it 
 
(William Cronon ed., 1995).  Fully exploring this point is beyond the scope of 
this essay but my sense is that Cronon may have been presuming something 
this essay does not about the inevitability of population growth when he made 
his critique. 
 121. Purdy, supra note 72, at 1127 n. 5 (providing a good summary of the more 
explicit claims). 
 122. See Jamison E. Colburn, The Indignity of Federal Wildlife Habitat Law, 
57 ALA. L. REV. 417, 457 (2005). 
 123. Id. at 457. 
 124. See generally Jill M. Fraley, Re-examining Acts of God, 27 PACE ENVTL. L. 
REV. 669 (2010). 
 125. Colburn, supra note 122, at 457.  Fraley’s article critiques the notion of 
separating the human from the natural, but at one point she herself presumes 
the divide. See Fraley, supra note 124, at 682 (“Roast turkey, for example, may 
be visibly enhanced using beet coloring extracts.  The beet coloring extracts are 
a naturally occurring, not human engineered product, but in nature the beet 
coloring would not be found within the turkey.”). 
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through a series of studies showing that indigenous people 
destroyed much of the ecosystems they occupied – studies which 
were premised on the distinction between the ecosystems and the 
humans causing them damage.126 
The ability to objectively distinguish a human from a non-
human in the world is, as one commentator noted, one of the 
foundations of the study of anthropogenic climate change.127  If 
we can identify humans and their power, control, and influence 
apart from their surroundings, the two are logically distinct, and 
to the extent we can measure a spectrum of human influence on 
the non-human world, the interest protected by the primary is 
coherent.  If we can say that one place is more wild than another, 
or if we can envision a world without humans, or an ongoing 
diminishment in human influence on the non-human,128 then 
practical reasoning based on the primary right is possible. 
Secondly, because primary right analysis involves a 
continuum of human power, control and influence, rather than a 
simple dualistic description of the world as divided into the 
human and non-human, it avoids the oversimplification, which is 
usually the proper target of the critique.  The objection that 
persons can never entirely reach the ideal, does not defeat the 
claim that the ideal might prove a basis for a right, any more 
than the claim that a state can never achieve perfect and 
universal suffrage defeats the right to vote, or that a state can 
never perfect free speech defeats rights aspiring to that ideal. 
Thirdly, these critiques all seem leveled at descriptions of the 
divide between human and nature – something one would expect 
of scientific commentary.  However, the primary right described 
herein is a normative concept, not a description of the physical 
world.  Asserting that the Earth is dominated by humanity is no 
answer to the argument that we ought to be able to access places 
theoretically approaching the wilderness lying at the far end of 
the spectrum.  The norm of free speech Farber refers to never 
relies on the actual predominance of free speech but on the ideal 
 
 126. See generally WILDERNESS AND POLITICAL ECOLOGY: ABORIGINAL 
INFLUENCES AND THE ORIGINAL STATE OF NATURE (Charles E. Kay & Randy T. 
Simmons eds., 2002). 
 127. Fraley, supra note 124, at 684. 
 128. See generally ALAN WEISMAN, THE WORLD WITHOUT US (2007). 
46http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol29/iss3/5
  
906 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol.  29 
 
of free speech to be asserted against the status quo.  In other 
words, the ought of free speech to be asserted against the is of a 
lack of free speech.  That is the whole point of asserting a right. 
The normative approach does not involve cold scientific 
observation of changes in the world, but hot anger at the ongoing 
loss of something valuable, followed by a search for the best way 
stop the loss, restore the world as close to the ideal as physically 
possible, and take compensation from those responsible for the 
restoration, and restitution where restoration falls short.  In 
short, the danger lies not in falsely dividing humans from nature; 
the danger lies in the human world pushing the nonhuman world 
out of existence. 
In addition to the counterarguments raised above, this essay 
has raised several questions among commentators that readers 
might find helpful and wish to have answered. 
1) Would offering persons that wished to exit the 
polity a chance to live alone on a space station 
fulfill the primary right? 
No, because the person on the station is, while alone and 
perhaps outside of the scope of particular political obligations, 
still in a world others made and therefore subject to their power.  
The primary right is pegged to wilderness as an ideal because 
wilderness represents places with relatively little human 
influence, the far side of a spectrum of human power.  A space 
station is the opposite – and conflating it with wilderness is an 
example of the territory trap described above. 
2) Will the primary right lead to a tragedy of the 
commons and does this defeat the right? 
No. First, the tragedy of the commons is the overuse of 
commonly-owned resources. Owning the wilderness is 
antithetical to the ideal of non-polity. Second, the primary right 
specifically prohibits influencing others, so many uses, and 
certainly overuse, is prohibited.  As such, the primary right works 
to protect spaces that would be subject to human overuse.  
Thirdly, as discussed above, the primary right forces us to look at 
the root cause of environmental degradation: human population 
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growth.  Coincidentally, Garret Hardin, the author credited with 
recognizing the tragedy of the commons, also recognized 
population (and not common ownership) as the key cause of 
environmental degradation.  His initial discussion of the tragedy 
of the commons and subsequent writings make that clear,129 and 
not recognizing that when relying on the tragedy of the commons 
model is disingenuous to his work. 
Also, were the primary right to cause the tragedy of the 
commons, that consequentialist argument would not prima facie 
defeat the right any more than claims that a right to be free of 
unreasonable search and seizure increase crime.  The primary 
right is fully supported by the premises of autonomy, power, and 
consent described above, and if you accept them you must accept 
the right.  Undesirable consequences are simply to be balanced 
against the right.  Moreover, because the primary right has never 
been recognized in the world and protected as such, arguments 
about its consequences are speculative.  That is, why they are 
mentioned, but not relied upon above. 
3) Is non-polity or wilderness as described in this 
essay the same as wilderness as defined under 
domestic and international law?  Because no legally 
defined wilderness area meets the ideal, is the right 
defeated? 
No. As discussed above, this essay refers to positive law 
reflections of the ideal of the non-human world – i.e., duties 
imposed on us by the Wilderness Act – that parallel the core 
duties that make up the primary right, but the right need not rely 
on positive law and the two should not be conflated.  The right 
stands on its own, assuming one accepts the premises regarding 
autonomy, consent, and power that it is derived from.  The 
primary right provides a theoretical basis for and explains 
positive law norms, and its reflection in positive law is evidence 
that we value something very much like the right, but it does not 
 
 129. See generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 
1243 (1968); Garret Hardin, THE IMMIGRATION DILEMMA: AVOIDING THE TRAGEDY 
OF THE COMMONS (1995); Garret Hardin, THE OSTRICH FACTOR: OUR POPULATION 
MYOPIA (1999). 
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rely on positive law like the Wilderness Act.  The primary right is 
a reason to change the law, and is not contingent upon it. 
4) Does it matter which theory of political consent we 
use? 
No. While persons might be able to consent expressly, 
implicitly, or hypothetically, one of the most important reasons 
for recognizing and respecting the primary right is that no form of 
consent is possible without an alternative to human polities.  One 
cannot leave any country if one cannot leave, and truly leave, all 
countries. 
5) Does the presence of many people in a given tract of 
wilderness constitute a violation of all their 
primary rights? 
No, unless those persons are interfering with others’ bare 
autonomy.  This is not as theoretical as it sounds but is 
comparable to rules laid out under the Wilderness Act and its 
regulations, and inherent in what is commonly known as the 
“wilderness ethic.”  I am exercising something very much like a 
balanced version of the primary right when I hike alone for the 
day in Yosemite.  But because I cannot reasonably access it due to 
traffic, and because others constantly cross my path, and because 
the flora and fauna have been degraded, and because the non-
polity we call Yosemite is bordered and therefore halted by 
clusters of human influence, I am far from the ideal of non-polity.  
That ideal, and the primary right that protects it, are reasons to 
change existing policies, by weighing my interest in non-polity 
more heavily so that whatever is interfering with me approaching 
the ideal be stopped.  Yosemite is not ideal, but it is closer to the 
ideal than Manhattan.  Without the ideal I would not know that.  
Moreover, that ideal, and the construct of a human right that 
protects it, is useful legally because if Congress attempts to 
eliminate Yosemite by building strip-malls there, only seeing 
access to it as a fundamental right under the Constitution is 
likely to protect the area. 
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6) Does the primary right ensure Hobbesian chaos in 
wilderness by removing a dominant sovereign or 
polity? 
No. Assuming the primary right is respected, it prohibits the 
interference with others, which was the central concern of 
Hobbes.  If the right is being respected, persons in the wilderness 
will not interfere with others, much less kill, maim, or steal from 
them.  Some will argue that recognizing the right would lead to 
such a state of affairs, but it could never be the proximate cause; 
people doing that which Hobbes feared is the proximate cause of 
such a state of affairs.  Moreover, even where the primary right is 
the cause, such consequentialist arguments do not prima facie 
defeat the right. 
7) Is non-polity or wilderness an euphemism for 
political anarchy, and thus a reductio ad absurdum 
of liberal political thought? 
No. Non-polity is a relatively novel concept, especially as 
used in this essay.  It is a description of an ideal, or value, which 
forms the basis of a human right, much the way the value or ideal 
of an education forms the basis for claims of a human right to be 
educated.  Non-polity refers to the ideal of physical space absent 
human influence.  In contrast, anarchy refers to the absence of 
government or political authority.  The two differ in several ways.  
First, as discussed above, the ideal of non-polity requires one 
human alone in the wilderness, whereas anarchy traditionally 
refers to persons seceding and living together.130  I distinguish 
the primary right from secession above – while the former makes 
room for the latter, that room is merely incidental.  Second, 
anarchy is the absence of political obligation, which I distinguish 
above from the absence of power.  Non-polity calls for the latter – 
not simply a wilderness void of government, but of human 
influence upon the person enjoying the right.  Finally, because 
non-polity is an ideal, balanced against other rights and interests, 
it will likely never be fully realized the way anarchy has been and 
 
 130. See Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism and Secession, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 
633, 634 n.8 (1991). 
50http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol29/iss3/5
  
910 PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW [Vol.  29 
 
will be.  One balance will be that non-polities will likely exist, 
physically, within the borders of polities and be subject to at least 
some form of contingent power, at the very least to protect the 
primary right.  Balancing the right, as with all rights (like the 
right to free speech), does not defeat it.  But the primary right, 
and the values it collects together conceptually, allow for the 
balancing to occur. 
8) Is the primary right – a right to be stateless and live 
outside any of the nations – something generally 
regarded as undesirable? 
Yes, depending on the competing rights and interests.  As 
discussed above, the ideal of non-polity includes not being under 
the political authority of a state.  While non-polities within 
polities might have to be balanced against competing rights and 
interests (so that Yosemite, while pristinely non-human, would 
still be under the jurisdiction of the United States, which is less 
of an influence on my bare autonomy than snowmobiles running 
past my camp there), the space between polities (the oceans for 
example) might provide a greater opportunity for statelessness.  
While some may regard being stateless as undesirable, that may 
be because they cannot return to any polity.  There is nothing in 
the primary right itself that says we have to renounce any 
particular form of statehood.  Other factors aside, a right to exit 
does not itself imply a bar to reentry. 
9) Does anthropogenic climate change and other forms 
of worldwide environmental degradation mean the 
primary right is nugatory because the ideal it seeks 
has ceased to exist?  Does the presence of political 
authority over wilderness areas vitiate the concept? 
No.  In fact, we are faced with mass environmental 
degradation and the threat of climate change because of the 
failure to articulate a first generation human right to a particular 
environment, ignoring the compelling weight that the notion of 
political consent carries in policy debates and opting instead to 
use less effective baselines for environmental regulation. 
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Firstly, as discussed above, the ideal at the core of the 
primary right, like ideals in all rights, must be balanced against 
competing ideals in other rights, e.g., much like the ideal of free 
speech is balanced against the ideal of national security.  So not 
completely reaching the ideal of the primary right – such as the 
less-intrusive influence of being under a particular political 
authority that happens to never set foot in the wilderness at issue 
– is expected.  We have a right to speak freely, even though that 
right has been balanced against national security concerns.  We 
can likewise have a primary right that is balanced against others’ 
right to live in the wilderness.  But, just as it is physically 
impossible to restore a person who has been tortured to the state 
of affairs they were in before the torture, we use that pre-torture 
theoretical state of affairs to compensate them in vindication of 
their right not to be tortured.  The same can be done with the 
primary right – we can use the ideal of the non-human world to 
practically reason in that direction.  Secondly, while even 
wilderness zones would be very much the product of human 
influence in that we would have created them by law, non-human 
influences would, over time, supersede human influences to make 
them relatively non-human. 
10)  How would the right work “in real life?” 
The primary right could be recognized and codified as a 
universal, international civil and political right through treaty, as 
a logical extension and part and parcel of other rights in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.  In addition, the right 
could be recognized by the United States Supreme Court under a 
disjunctive “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty”131 
fundamental rights analysis for all the reasons, given above, that 
the primary right is central to the ordering of liberty.  If the 
Court can declare, without any textual footing, that procreation is 
protected under the Constitution as “one of the basic civil rights 
 
 131. Anthony C. Cicia, A Wolf in Sheep's Clothing?: A Critical Analysis of 
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of man,”132  it can recognize that right which makes consensual 
political association possible. 
In either case, via international or domestic law, recognizing 
the right would at the least provide a basis to reweigh wilderness 
as a value in any legal dispute over the protection or restoration 
of wilderness so that it counts for more than a simple interest, 
much the way political speech counts for more than a simple 
interest when weighed against competing interests. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This essay has introduced the concept of the primary right, a 
human rights claim to non-polity and wilderness based upon 
autonomy and consent.  This right makes a valuable contribution 
to environmental law theory by clarifying that if we value the 
political autonomy that comes from the possibility of completely 
exiting all polities, we are compelled to value the non-human 
world and access to it.  In other words, if you value autonomy and 
political consent, you also value the nonhuman world, and 
therefore would presumably want it to exist somewhat nearby.  
This essay adds to the literature by forcing us to see the non-
human world as a medium by which humans exert power over 
each other, and by proposing that the baseline for environmental 
law – that field of law which regulates the relationship between 
humans and the non-human world – should be the non-human 
world itself.  In the end, the primary right only asks that we be 
left alone, literally, that we have the right to be left alone. 
The claims made herein are not meant to belittle other 
sufficient bases for a right to wilderness, such as diversity and 
knowledge.  Every argument for the value of “diversity,” in 
universities, in corporations, in politics, that is, the diversity 
among one species, speaks to a value that is dwarfed by the value 
of true and complete biodiversity in the nonhuman world.  The 
value that biodiversity represents, which is the opposite of a viral 
human monoculture, could support the primary right.  Even 
religious rights could suffice, at least of the thoughtful sort that 
truly value the non-human world and commands that we not 
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replace it with a human version.  However, the primary right is 
markedly different from these; it is based upon the values of 
autonomy and consent, and thus responds directly to liberals that 
make the mistake of pitting individual autonomy and wilderness 
protection against one another.  The primary right is also 
demanded as a human right, which is a way of making a demand 
when the speaker and those that agree with her see the thing to 
be protected as overriding many of the rules and interests that 
make up the status quo. So-called environmentalists, those that 
really value the political freedom Thoreau’s absolute freedom and 
wildness represent, should have demanded this right long ago 
and taken the action necessary to secure it. 
In the Senate debate on the 1964 Wilderness Act, Senator 
Frank Church of Idaho stated that “without wilderness this 
country will become a cage.”133  He may have meant that humans 
can never be free of human power, control, and influence if the 
non-human world ceases to exist.  The primary right is a 
powerful, human rights-based argument preventing this.  Future 
work will show that the primary right can be supported by 
positive law (both domestic and international), as further 
reflected in common law doctrines like false imprisonment, and 
that protecting and promoting the primary right is politically, 
economically, and culturally feasible.  However, even if the claims 
made herein are eventually proven untrue, we are obligated, as a 
provisional matter, to protect wilderness and biodiversity while 
the debate is being resolved lest we lose the very thing we are 
debating. 
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